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Hey, everybody. Hey, everybody. Welcome to another episode of
the all in podcast. We have a new bestie yes, the filling in
for the prince of panic attacks. The Queen of quinoa, the
sultan of science can’t make it this week. I think after his
incredible performance last week, and him trending on tiktok
with his incredible insights over sadly, the the potential
famine that could come after this Ukraine war. He decided he
would take a week off. I think it’s just a little too much
attention for him. So we have a bestie guestie today. Yes, the
shaman of stocks is with us. He brings the equanimity to
equities. You know him. He’ll bring that namaste to your pay
day predictions are the anti Galloway. Brad Gerstner. Welcome
back to the program.
Thanks for having me. Namaste.
And also with us, of course, the rain man, man himself. He’s
bitter on Twitter. He’s brawling on Colin. He’s the Bill of
Rights from Pack Heights.
Sacks, boy, you’ve really outdone yourself today. And the
prince of Palo Alto, the overlord of the Overton window.
Shema Polly hoppity. Oh,
Jake, are you the stinker of stonks? Oh, God, relax. You
don’t leave the comedy to me. All right.
Rain Man David
we open source to the fans and they’ve just gone crazy.
It’s been a pretty, pretty crazy couple of weeks here. We are
not a political show here. But obviously, when world affairs
become acute, as they have, we cannot ignore the war that is
occurring in Ukraine. We’re going to talk a little bit
about markets. I think we’ll start with those with Brad
Gerstner here, the SAS market, and the index. Why don’t you
walk us through this chart here? Because everybody’s
wondering what’s happening with the markets given the war, given
interest rate hikes, and the repricing of stocks. I don’t
know how you would look at what happened in November, December,
January, Brad, how do you contextualize
certainly a repricing is certainly a repricing, but I
think of it more as normalization. Okay. Right.
Chamath was saying it November, I was I was on CNBC talking
about the fact that when, when we got to a post COVID world
rates, we’re going to normalize go back to where they were in
January 2020. That was around 2%. And the growth multiples
would have to come off of this historic Red Bull high that we
were on during most of 2020 and 2021. So we were 30 to 50%,
depending upon the index above the five year average growth
multiple pre COVID. So that just needed to happen. Like we should
be celebrating in one sense that that happened, because that
means that we overcame a global pandemic. The downside is we
couldn’t play with artificial money, 0% rates, trillions of
dollars, you know, of congressional and fed injection
in order to prop up valuations. And when it happened in and of
itself, that was going to be extraordinarily painful. What I
didn’t anticipate and what most people didn’t anticipate is that
on top of that, we’re going to have increasing fears of hyper
inflation, not just getting back to normal rates, and that
we were going to find ourselves in the middle of an incredibly
devastating war in Ukraine, those two things added to the
uncertainty, the risk premiums added to uncertainty around
future inflation, the dot plot exploded higher and expectations
of forward rates went higher. Now, why the hell does this
matter? It matters because when you take you know, if you’re
looking at that chart, the five year average, the 10 year was
two and a half percent, like we all got comfortable investing in
this period of time, the markets hate uncertainty, we had a
predictable way for us to estimate where we thought our
wax should be in our discounted cash flow models. All of a
sudden, that was thrown into thrown into the air. Oh my god,
look what we got going.
Look at this. Oh, yeah, never compete with babies or animals.
No chance. No chance. Hey, this is Talita. Talita. Look at this
little look at this little butterball. Oh, my Lord, look at
that. So so good. Saks. That’s called a child. It’s a you have
three of them. Those are babies. And what you’re seeing there is
affection from a father and a child. Look at how cute this
little baby is.
Sax is like, well, this is taken from my time. Get that baby out
of here. So cute. So Brad, I guess what everybody wants to
know now that we see this repricing occur is what do you
think is going to happen in 2022? And then into 2023?
So we’re now multiples are now below the five year average for
software. We’re about at the five year average for internet.
We’re well below the five year average. I said on Twitter that
the rate path last week became a lot more certain the Fed said
something last week that I think is still not well reported well
understood. The Fed said at the end of the year, we’re going to
have 2% negative real rates. They said we expect inflation
exiting the year to be 4.3. And we expect the 10 year to be
around 2.3. The reason the market exploded higher is
because under the Fed’s prior protocol, a 4% a 4% inflationary
rate would mean that rates would have to go to four and a half.
And if you take rates to four and a half, then growth
multiples need to be about 30% below the five year average.
Okay, so as investors, whether we’re investing in mid stage
venture, late stage venture, whether we’re investing in the
public markets, like we need to know what exit multiples are. And
it was bad enough that we had to bear the drawdown coming off of
you know, this, this Red Bull high of 2020 and 21. But if you
think we’re durably going to an inflation rate of 3%, or 4%, and
an interest rate environment of 3%, or 4%, then you simply have
to adjust what you’re willing to pay for growth assets. And so as
I look ahead, right, we don’t, we don’t know with certainty.
The question is, what’s the distribution of probabilities?
And, you know, just this morning, Citi, Goldman Sachs
raised their exit year, their their exit 10 year for 2022 to
2.7%, and took it as high as three and a half percent for
- I think it’s going to this period is going to be marked by a
lot of uncertainty around inflation and rates till we have
more clarity. And what that means is allocators of capital
are going to allocate less to risk assets, and they’re going
to pay less for risk assets. But you know, listen, if I look out
over the 5-10 year horizon, I don’t believe in global
stagflation. I don’t believe that we’re in this new
hyperinflation environment. But we’re going to have to get
through this next 6-12-18 months. And it’s going to be
filled with a lot of volatility and a lot of uncertainty.
Jamal, what rings most true about what Brad just said? And
then what can you add to the prediction for this coming year?
I mean, I don’t know what the prediction for this year is. I
think the markets are mostly moving upwards for the short
term. And then I think volatility is going to come
back. I’m just trying to find good long term businesses and
just kind of close my eyes and not have to look at these stock
prices every day. And as long as I can manage my own psychology,
I think I’ll be fine. And I think that’s probably the thing
that most of us need to be doing. The interesting thing
about Brad said is that the implication of that is that it
means that late stage venture is pretty badly mispriced.
And I think you’re going to have to knock these things back by
50 60%. I think you saw the first real big movement there
yesterday, which was the Instacart print, right, we went
from a $40 billion valuation to I think it was 24. If you look
at from February of last year, which was really the high for
all of us, right, that’s when we all thought we could do no
wrong. You know, the comps to Instacart are off anywhere
between 50 and 70%. You know, takeaway is off 70%. Uber is
down 60% DoorDash was down 55%. So these are some big moves. And
so, you know, it made sense that Instacart had to get kind of
like reset. The problem that it has is that it’s now the nth
player trying to get public into a space with many players who’ve
guzzled up a lot of capital in a low rate environment. And so if
you think about company building, this is why
entrepreneurs have to pay attention to this stuff. You
want to get money when money is cheap. But the problem is you
can’t control that timing. And so if you can’t control your
operating margins and your profitability, then you’re
going to have to go and basically pay somebody an
enormously high price to get their money. And I think that’s
what’s setting itself up to happen in a bunch of these
markets. I think enterprise SAS has always claimed long term
profitability. The thing is, when you look at sort of like
the real long term companies, they’ve built some enormous
moats, right? Like if you look at a service now or a Salesforce
at the high end, and then there’s a crop of a couple of
companies like Palo Alto networks, who are the next ones
coming after who seemed like behemoths in the making. But
everybody else, I think people have to really question like
where the long term profitability going to come
from. And so if that’s true, then the late stage private SAS
companies are in trouble. Similarly, in places like
delivery, where again, you’ve had a bunch of comps come out,
they’ve been curing in the public markets for years, you
know, Uber, DoorDash, there’s a couple of these behemoths
getting built DoorDash being the most obvious. And then there’s
a bunch of more kind of question mark business models, including
Uber, which is not really hanging together in the public
markets. So I think the real question for entrepreneurs is if
you have the nth business, nth being not the first, not the
second, but you’re the seventh or eighth or 10th trying to go
public, and all the seven or eight before you are gas
guzzling machines, you’re going to pay a very heavy price to get
public. And I think that that’s the reckoning that we’re
starting to see. So I’m really interested to see how that
plays out. You know, the Instacart valuation could easily
be cheap at 24. But it could just as easily be overpriced by
another $10 billion, depending on how people think about who
the last buyer of resort is in the public markets.
Saks did Instacart missed their window to go public. And then
what does this say about the backlog of hundreds of
unicorns that the venture community is investing heavily
in?
Some of them are probably gonna have to IPO at down rounds. I
think that’s sort of the takeaway.
Explain what that is to to neophytes.
Well, it just means that they’re gonna have to go public at
evaluation lower than what the last private round was. So all
of these late stage private investors who assumed that they
would always make money investing in a company in the
last private round before when public they thought that was
sort of an automatic gain and arbitrage and it’s not and
there’s going to be some disappointment there. Brad’s
been sharing these charts with me since I guess what December,
Brad, where the charts basically show public SAS valuations as a
multiple of ARR. And then he’s got a similar chart for it sort
of the internet companies that sort of nonsense internet
companies as a function of revenue. And we’ve been looking
at these charts. You know, once Brad showed these to me, again,
four months ago, it became so obvious what was going on, which
is that valuations were reverting back to the
historical mean, if you look at, you know, during the two year
period during COVID, the they the multiples had risen to some
insane level, right. And because of all the liquidity that had
been pumped into the system. So as soon as you saw that the
charts that way, you could just see where things were headed,
which is back to historical averages. Now we’re below those
averages, partly because no, no, no, no, not really, the multiples
are, can I summarize Brad’s chart, because it is extremely
elegant and simple for the layman to understand. So here’s
the layman’s understanding of Brad’s analysis, technical
analysis and, and and balance sheet and P&L analysis, which is
accurate. When rates are zero, typically people are willing to
pay eight times revenue for a company. Okay, so if you’re
generating 100 million revenue, top line revenue, you’re
generating $100 million revenue in your reasonably high margin
reasonably high growth software business, that’s worth $800
million in the public markets. For every 100 basis point
increase in rates, you decrease the valuation between 15 and 20%.
So if you think rates are 2.75%, the price is somewhere
between 30 to 40% cheaper than what it was when rates were at
zero. So if you go back and you look at every TechCrunch
article, and every Bloomberg article, and every information
article, and you look at all those headline valuations, when
rates were at zero, we all just said rates are going to be
somewhere between, you know, 2.5 to 3% at the end of this year,
at a minimum, you have to haircut those things by 30 to 40%
steady state, meaning the company is continuing to execute
on all on all cylinders. If they have a downtick in their
performance, then it increases that discount. If rates go
higher, it increases the discount. But the basic way to
think about this is for every 100 basis point increase in
rates, you got to downtake that valuation by 15 to 20%.
And I think, you know, just to be fair, I think, I don’t think
there’s a daylight between you and sacks on this, what, what’s
actually saying is the 40% giving the numerical rule that
I think you’re right, that is the, that is the correlation.
And so this idea, listen, we all get paid to find good companies
and avoid bad companies. That’s generally what we get paid to do
we’re decent at it. All of a sudden, in fact, most
fundamental investors say, Hey, I’m not a macro expert. I don’t
know where inflation is going. I don’t know where interest rates
going, I just find good companies. We’ve had a decade or
longer, where that was okay to do that was easy to do. Because
guess what, inflation was at two. And we had two and a half
percent 10 year, when all of a sudden you have massive
volatility in that it’s not acceptable as an investor just
to say, well, none of this matters, because it does matter.
Right price matters, because what you can exit for is
essential to the game. And there were a lot of people invest in
2013, 14 and 15. When when the cost of entry was low and
exited, when the cost of entry was high, multiple expansion
hides many sins, right? And now just the opposite is happening
in a dramatic and historic way, in that multiples were higher
than they’ve ever been caused by a global pandemic. And the exit
rate for a lot of those companies, right is going to be
very painful. I think that sacks his point about downround IPOs,
I don’t think this is the exception, David, no Reddit, I
think the vast majority of companies that come public in
the next 12 months are going out below their last valuation.
Yes, the Reddit rumor was that Goldman put a $10 billion price
on the cover. And that, you know, it effectively been cut in
half. Again, these are all rumors. So these could
completely not be true. I don’t I don’t have any knowledge one
way or the other, to 5 billion. And that may actually end up
being too expensive. It just depends on where the market is.
Well, just so people are clear, when investors, sophisticated
investors make these late stage valuations at very high
multiples, like they have, they do have some downside
protections. In other words, they cannot lose more than the
money that was put in when this thing IPOs or they may get
kickers of additional shares. So maybe
these IPO No, no, in fairness, you’re talking about something
very important. But they’re very rarely in these high price
rounds, because most of these high price rounds are in go go
companies where all of those rights get stripped away. This
is why I do think Jason, what you’re actually bringing up is
in the last innings of a bull market, you have incredibly
irresponsible behavior by a bunch of these investors. And
that’s also going to get exposed as well. So Jason, what you’re
talking about is what’s called an IPO ratchet. Yeah, which
means I’m giving you this money at this price. But if you can’t
IPO at this price, then you’re going to give me an equivalent
number of shares that makes me whole, right, right. So it’s as
if I am, I am indifferent to what price you IPO at, that’s
extremely dilutive, to really one really important class of
individual, which is the employees of the company. It’s
also really dilutive to other investors who’ve come in before
them. But Jason, you’re probably right, to the extent that there
were IPO ratchets, they’ll get triggered. But I think in many
of these go go companies, and you know, Brad and sacks can
confirm, but I see it, all those rights get stripped away. It’s
like coming at this crazy price. Yeah, we’re not negotiating it
no governance, you know, get get our logo on your fundraising
deck for the next round. And so this is the price of the
capital. It’s been a little bit of sloppy behavior, just so
people understand this, if the Reddit valuation was 10 billion,
somebody put in, you know, 100 million in this late stage
round, if it came out at 5 billion, they would get twice as
many shares to make up for that difference.
That doesn’t exist in the case of Reddit, Jay cow, you know, as
fidelity who led that last round, so they’re going to be
price takers at whatever price the company comes public. What
does that mean? Explain that price take? So you know, if they
come public at $5 billion, and you put in $100 million, your
stake is now worth 50 million. Right, right. So you lost,
didn’t they have the discipline to put in these protective
provisions, ratchets, etc. What happened in the market
to Chamath’s point, they haven’t really existed in most deals for
the last five years. Right? I go back to 2000. I think 2007 2008
kayak raised money with a ratchet and their last pre IPO
round, it prevented them from getting public for three or four
years, that dilution overhang was a significant impediment to
getting public. So, you know, listen, we all know that Groupon
raised at $20 billion went public in a year laters were 2
billion. I mean, it’s not as though this hasn’t happened
before. But yes, people people got a little lackadaisical. I
just wanted to I just want to say one other thing, though,
because multiples coming down as a problem. What this really
reveals is the importance of stock and company selection.
Right? Because if you are a shitty company with an unproven
business model, right way out on the risk curve, okay. And you
had a super high valuation last year. And you don’t, you know,
there’s a good chance you never grow in it grow into it. You
never get back to that valuation example, your example, your
growth will decel. Well, give us an example company. Okay.
discord.
In the 15 minute delivery space in Europe, go puff. You know, I
would say go puff is one of the best of them. There are a lot of
startups that got funded with billions of dollars in Europe,
unproven business models burning tremendous amount of cash,
right? Like, I don’t know why they need to exist. I don’t
think they’re going to get funded. Right? Maybe one or two
of them do. But when you have DoorDash and Uber that are free
cash flow positive, that have strong brands, and that can
redeploy those profits back into compete in those markets think
it’s very tough.
neobanks are another example, neobanks, you know, the number
of neobanks that have been funded at exorbitant valuations,
where, you know, the problem is all of these financial services
companies are essentially an arbitrage on rates, right? When
rates are zero, they take that money at 0%. And then they can
go and execute a business model, you know, and sell that money at
1% and take the difference. But when their cost of capital is
two or two and a half or 3%, the whole business implodes on them.
So you’re going to see a bunch of these financial services
companies get under pressure. Another example, Jason is like
all the low end, you know, bottoms up SaaS companies. And
the reason is because they spend their time inside of Google and
Facebook doing customer acquisition and managing this
very intricate dance of LTV to CAC. And when all of those input
costs go up, their business implodes, because you can’t
raise rates faster, or you can’t raise prices, I would say faster
than the input costs are, and then all of a sudden, your unit
economics blow up. And in all of this, what is the salvation in a
moment like this? It’s being healthy gross margins, healthy
contribution margins, and a and a realistic path to
profitability, which means being EBITDA positive this year, or
within the next two years,
said another way, if you’re profitable, you’re not going to
go away.
If you can’t, if you can’t show that you’re, you know, to use
the famous Paul Graham adage default alive, in a moment like
this, then you are a price taker, which means that you will
have to pay probably a very high cost of capital to raise
incremental capital to support a fundamentally fragile and non
resilient business model is the issue here, sacks, that when you
see the getter gorillas zap all these instant delivery companies
get funded at exorbitant prices, and they’re the seventh, eighth,
ninth, as Chamath is pointing out, no, no, no, Instacart was
the seventh. Those are like the 10th, 11th. Okay, so now here we
are. This to me seems like the fault of poor judgment by
capital allocator sacks. Are there too many venture funds
tasting chasing too few deals, and not thinking through what
investing in the 10th, 11th or 12th player in a market is going
to be able to do? Is it too much?
Venture part, I think part of what’s going on with the
companies you mentioned is that they’re physical world
companies, they are very capital intensive, they burn a lot of
money, they’re operationally intensive. I have sort of sour
I soured on those businesses years ago. And that’s why I just
focus on SAS, because they’re basically perfect gross margin
businesses. They’re very, they can be very capital efficient,
if the founders want to run them that way. So what we’re doing
now is telling founders lengthen your runway, be more
capital efficient, you need to understand that, you know,
multiples, if you raise last year at 100 times ARR, you need
to understand that the next time you raise it may be at 20 times
ARR. So now you can grow into that, right? If you’re tripling
and then triple again, the next year, you’ll be able to grow
into that valuation. But, you know, make your money last two,
three, four years, instead of, you know, burning it in 12 to
18 months, unless you want to down round.
I think this is this is the point that now,
allocators, venture capitalists are going to spend the next six
months thinking about what’s in bucket one, low quality
companies burning a lot of cash that may very well not make it
across the chasm, no path to profitability, what are the high
quality companies that yeah, the multiples down because public
market multiples are down risk premiums have changed inflation
change, but they have plenty of cash on the balance sheet. And
think about it this way. Snowflake became a poster child
in the public markets of a high priced SaaS business. Snowflake
this year will grow its free cash flow at over 100% a year
next year, probably, you know, 80 or 90% free cash flow, not
just revenue, free cash flow. In Q4, I think they booked 1.4
billion of revenue Q4 on a business that entirely in last
year did 1.2 billion in revenue, right? You think about that the
incremental was more than what they had generated in the prior
many years, that business. So let’s say we reduce the
multiple by 50%. But the company’s growing top line and
free cash flow by 100% doesn’t take you very long to grow
through the multiple compression. So snowflakes
multiple is plummeting for two reasons. One, because the stock
price came down. Number two, because right, their growth rate
and free cash flow growth is so high. And so now if you look at
the multiple, it’s similar to what we would expect of a
regression of the five year analysis,
unless these companies unless these private companies are want
to go dark for the next three to five years, meaning not, you
know, no sophisticated late stage investor doing around or
going public, they’ll be okay. But otherwise, they’re going to
have to reckon with a version of what Brad just said, which is
the high the flight to quality problem. You know, when in
moments of uncertainty and high volatility, it’s just more
straightforward to go to the things that are reliable. And so
you know, when you think in the public tech markets, what is a
reliable must own company? Well, I would put snowflake in the
list of these must own high growth software businesses,
right? You know, the fangs tend to be in the must own category.
But then there are all these other businesses that then get
orphaned, because they’re kind of nice to own, would love to
own would be great in any other circumstance. And that gets even
more exacerbated in the in the private markets, you have to
remember, right now, like the private markets cannot really
exist without an incremental buyer of equity, right? A bag
holder, somebody has somebody needs to be somebody needs to be
the bag holder after you. And the problem right now is that
those folks have a lot more credible, safe, durable assets
that they can own, and not have to deal with all the crazy
anxiety that comes with owning something that’s, that’s high
volatility, like
or Chamath, correct me if I’m wrong, or Brad, if they don’t
want to even be involved in this machine, you know, they could
just be in cash, and the interest rates are going up. So
maybe they could say, you know what, I’ll just sit this out for
a year. Is that also happening with those folks? Well, I think
too hard to do because of
Brad actually knows a bunch of these folks. But like, take, for
example, D1, you know, it’s Dan Sondheim’s great investor. I
mean, my understanding is that they are sort of off privates
completely. Because why invest in a private company at x times
ARR when you can invest in a public SaaS company for six
times. So they’ve substituted, I think Tiger is still in market
with a gigantic fund for privates, but the valuations
have come down. So they’re essentially repricing
everything. I think those are probably the two broad
reactions you could have, right, Brad?
Certainly, I would say this, broadly speaking, the late
stage private financing market in venture is closed. Because
there hasn’t been, right, we’re in this, this buyer seller
standoff. sellers aren’t to the point where they’re willing to
accept that a new rate, a new regime of multiples exists.
Right? It’s painful. We saw, you know, the Instacart news here
recently. But I think, you know, like, listen, we’re not
even 10 or 20% of the way into the psychic reset that needs to
occur in order for us to see real price discovery. That’s not
going to occur until these companies need money or want to
go public. That’s right. This fall is when we’ll start to see
real price discovery. You couldn’t pry a late stage dollar
out of my hand right now. Because I don’t think that we
have real price discovery going on early stage venture for
investing in an incredible, you know, software business at 300
million 400 million 500 billion, we think could be worth 10s of
billions, you can withstand a little inflation. But the later
you get in the lifecycle of a business, it’s about IRRs and
IRRs in late stage at last year’s valuations relative
today’s public market valuations. That is a negative
arbitrage.
Explain IRR why that matters? Yeah, just
you know, we expect our herder rate in the public markets is a
20% risk adjusted rate of return. So if I’m, you know,
like, you know, you look at these late stage private
valuations from last year, I mean, you know, Sachs just talked
about companies repricing down 40 or 50 or 60%. So if they
haven’t done that,
now just to have a conversation,
just to uplevel this, what Brad is saying is the following
Jason, any person can wake up tomorrow, and by the S&P index,
right, what Buffett would tell you to do just by the S&P 500
index, that historically has compounded at around 8% a year
if you reinvest the dividends, so you can do nothing, right,
get a basket of the 500 best companies in the world that are
automatically selected for you based on revenue and
profitability, you don’t have to do anything. And that’ll
compound at 8%. That is effectively the risk free rate
if you want to own an equity. So if you’re going to step into
the late stage private markets, and you know, buy some shares
and you know, ding dong calm, you got to be rewarded for that,
which typically means that there’s a premium above the 8%.
And what Brad is saying, like, you know, it’s actually more
than double, in his case, what he’s saying is, it’s two and a
half times, you know, you got to clear 20% to you. Otherwise,
you’re better off on a risk.
is what’s likely to happen. I’m looking here at a list go puff
at 40 billion canva at 40 billion. Florida at 45 billion
discord at 15 billion ripple at 15 billion, these grammarly at
13 billion. These don’t make sense, given that if they were
public, they would be trading at
what you can 50% of that. Here’s what you can say. If if
everything is held equal, just with the rise of rates, you have
to reset those valuations between probably 15 and 40%.
Okay, at a minimum, minimum. But what Brad said is also true,
which is if they then keep growing at a superior rate, they
can get back to even so meaning 18 months, they could also show
up again at 40 and be net net awash, they could get unstuck,
but a lot of hard work will need to happen underneath the covers
of these businesses in the next two years, okay, for that to
happen.
And that’s what’s going to happen with a lot of these early
stage private companies, right is let’s say the error multiple
has gone from 100 times to 20 or 30 times, they have to grow
their error 5x to get the same valuation. So the question is,
can they grow their error 5x before having to return to
market, that’s just to get a flat round. Now, if they are
tripling this year, and then doubling next year, then that’s
6x growth in ARR. So even if you know, the multiples gone down
5x, they could still get a slight up round. So that’s the
game, I think all these companies are going to be
playing is lengthen your runway so that you can grow into your
valuation and not take a down round. Because the problem is,
if you’re ever in a situation where you take a down round,
it’s way worse than just the dilution, because now the
psychology of everyone in the company changes, everyone has to
worry that you’re gone sideways.
But here’s the difficulty of what sacks is saying, though, in
order to grow revenue, you have to invest, right, you have to
invest in salespeople and account management functions in
engineers and product managers, right. And all of those people
need to exist, which actually increases opex, right, it
increases burn, it doesn’t maintain burn. And so this is
the death spiral, Jason, you’re talking about, which is in order
to actually grow by those multiples, you actually don’t
have more fuel, you got to increase your speed, burn more
fuel, you don’t actually have the money to withstand two or
three or the altitude, you’re now so it’s going to be a very
precarious balancing act of trying to figure out how these
companies actually get to the other side. Because again, I
think the the buyers in this case will be will drive a hard
bargain. I mean, like, look, it’s organizations like, you
know, durable D one tiger altimeter, these guys are the
smartest of the smart, they’re not dumb. And so you know, the
price of capital is going up in that case. And so you know,
they’re going to strike really good opportunities for their
investors, right for their LPS, if we were going to do an
analogy, they’re 20%. The analogy here is these founders
were on autopilot, they were asleep at the wheel. And now all
of a sudden, they’re in the soup, and they got to really
perform. No, that’s not fair. I don’t think they were asleep at
the wheel at all. I just think that they, you know, when the
when the music is on, you got to dance. They did it, they
raised money at the highest valuation possible. God bless
them. Now, you’re going to see who is really good at what they
do. And who was benefiting from a lot of just natural, you know,
you know, right. But people were
already sharpening the pencils for the first time. For the
first time that I’m talking about, you have to make real
trade. Look, in an in an upmarket, well, in an upmarket
or a boom market, the three things that matter are growth,
growth and growth. In a down market, the three things that
matter are growth, burn and margins. It’s not that growth
stops mattering. It’s just that burn and margins also matter.
And now there’s gonna have to be real trade offs before it was
just how much money can we spend how quickly to get growth? Now
it’s wait a second, is this growth efficient? You know, and
will we have enough runway to get to the next round without
having to take it down round?
Brad, when we saw at the peak of the pandemic, some leadership,
I’d say, you know, seasoned or well informed leadership, Airbnb
and Uber come to mind, cut their staffs massively. They use that
crisis to reset their cost structure and get to
profitability quicker. Those were money losing businesses for
a long time, maybe, you know, taking advantage of these hot
markets. Is that what needs to happen here? Are we going to see
a cascade of companies, lowering their valuation, lowering their
cost, sharpening their pencils, cutting staff, and then becoming
more efficient, and more ruthless at, you know, the six,
seventh, eighth product, they’re launching saying, hey, let’s go
to the core product and make it sing, make it profitable.
You know, Frank Slootman has said that Silicon Valley is full
of companies that are walking dead, and they don’t even know
it. Right. You know, Frank is, you know, he says in tape socks,
he says, Listen, I’m a wartime CEO, not a peacetime CEO. Right.
He came into he came into snowflake when it was growing
over 300%. And he, you know, he reconstituted what what that
culture was about to prepare for wartime. Right? Because he says
when wartime comes, right, and it gets challenging, I want to
run the field. Right? I don’t want to be laying off employees.
I want to be that’s the time to hire. That’s the time to press
the advantage. That’s the time to invest in product. That’s the
time to win the new customers. Unfortunately, over the course of
the last 12 to 18 months, a lot of people without that
experience, right took a negative signal. And the signal
was money will always be available. And it will be
available at ever increasing valuations. And of course,
anybody who’s been at this for 20 years, like the four of us,
we know that isn’t true. But it’s amazing. I mean, the
behavioral psychology, our ability to gaslight ourselves
totally in these moments and move out on the risk curve and
ignore these lessons, right. And so I really actually hurt
and I’ve spent a lot of time on zooms lately, with founders and
with their teams, talking them through this, because like, we
talk about it in the abstract and in through the lens of a
spreadsheet. But there are a lot of people’s lives at stake. If
you’re an employee, and you went to this company, and you took
everything in stock at 15 billion, that’s now worth 5
billion, you’re totally underwater. At the same time,
the cost of buying a home and mortgage rates and everything
else is going up against you. I mean, this is a massive morale
problem, right? You know, for companies that frankly, we want
to invest in these are the innovators. But this is what
happens when you have government intrusion, right, that we can
all debate whether or not it’s worthwhile, but it was hugely
distortive. What we know to be true is that we had more
distortion in markets the last two years than probably any time
since post World War Two. And the consequence of that is
dramatic. And you know, we all kind of saw it, but we all kind
of gaslighted ourselves as well. Because you were like, well,
maybe there is a new normal, maybe we have accelerated
digitization. The truth of the matter is the law of economic
gravity is interest rates and inflation, and it remains.
Yeah. And and this time turns out is not really that much
different. I think Jason, if you take your list of these high
price startups, yep, I think it would be a good useful exercise
for somebody to do somebody in the press should probably do it.
But if you take that list and just rank companies based on
valuation, the last announced date, yep. And then if they’re
not announcing layoffs of any kind, you can probably forecast
when they’re going to burn through the money, especially if
they’re hiring. And the reason that you can probably forecast
that accurately is you can pretty much predict what opex
will be, especially knowing the fact that their input costs are
actually going up. So for example, most of these
businesses that rely on Facebook and Google and Instagram for
customer acquisition, those input costs are going up. And
the reason you know that is that’s $2 trillion of market cap
that doesn’t give a flying fuck what’s happening in startup
land, they’re going to make their numbers, right? Okay, those
are the most important companies in the world, they will ratchet
up the prices. And so your input costs are going up. It’s not
just the physical supply of materials that I think is going
up. It’s just the cost of customer acquisition is going to
probably go up by 2030 40%. Right? And you know this because
Facebook and Google guide to where they need to perform. And
so if you pass that through the venture ecosystem, that all of a
sudden now upticks your burn. Yeah, if you’re adding more
people, it upticks your burn. Yeah. And now back to David’s
math, you then also have to grow five or six x that it none of
this hangs together. So we are at the beginning of probably a
very complicated process of unwinding. Yeah, the distortion
that we’ve lived through in the last couple years.
At this point, I mean, you have to blame the capital allocators
in this instance, they bought these logos, they suspended
disbelief. We’ve had this ridiculous culture of no
governance, uncapped notes, just pushing, I see it on the boards
I’m on, you guys probably see to some people just pushing top
line growth, never discussing unique economics, never
discussing the bottom line. And they created these crazy fugazi
markups, they raised bigger funds based on it. And they just
were never the adults in the room, the stewards of capital,
it’s infuriating.
I’ll tell you an incredible conversation I had yesterday
with one of my partners. So he’s been, you know, with me for 10
years. He was really the one that pushed us very early on to
go into deep, deep, deep tech when nobody else is doing 3d
printing of rockets, satellites, all that stuff. And it’s been so
I really trust and respect his perspective. And he was telling
me a story. He called a recruiter, you know, because
we’ve been toying with, you know, helping get some folks to
help us manage some of our early stage deal flow. And he asked
her essentially something to the point of like, who are the types
of GPS that are getting hired today in early stage. And he
said, you know, this is how we approach our business, right? We
have a permanent capital balance sheet, you know, we do, you know,
at most one deal a year per partner. And she said, Well,
you’re never going to get anybody. Because a mid level
executive at one of these high flying startups that then goes
and joins a venture firm. She said, the consistent single
thing that they make their decision on, are you ready for
this? Is how many deals will I be allowed to do per year? What?
And so you know, these people are make work construction
workers, right? That’s dig a ditch fill a ditch. That is not
what investing is. That’s not about having a discerning
philosophy on what a business should be or a market. So if you
have a bunch of capital allocators, Jason, to your
point, who are unsophisticated about investing, probably very
sophisticated operationally, but fundamentally don’t know what
they’re doing. And they’re coming and transforming an
organization that should be a disciplined, discerning
allocator of capital and turning them into a velocity deal
machine. This is what you’re going to get.
I mean, sometimes the best money sacks is money you put into a
bet you’ve already made continuing to build the pot with
a startup that’s already proven themselves. Correct. So I think
we’re gonna see
we have a follow on fund. Yeah, I mean, I gotta say the things
you guys are saying are making me feel great about our
portfolio. Explain. Not not because we won’t get hit with
the same valuation corrections that everybody else is going to
suffer. But because, you know, a few years ago, we decided we
were going to invest in a certain kind of company. I mean,
high margin SaaS and marketplace businesses that were not capital
intensive, we defined a new metric that didn’t exist called
burn multiple, which is the amount of money you burn for
every dollar of incremental error that you generate
incremental subscription revenue. And, you know, we turned
out investments that were growing fast, but they had a
horrible burn multiple. And so and I do think most of our
companies raised last year when, you know, they made a while the
sun shine. So there’s going to be, they need to manage their
cash flow. So they don’t have to raise too quickly. But as
long as they do that, and they keep growing, they’re going to
weather the storm.
What’s the right number, spend $3 to make one spend $2 to add
one, what’s what’s your ratio?
So what I’ve said is that if you can spend $1 or less to generate
an incremental dollar of ARR, you’re doing amazing. And
between one and two is good. So in other words, if you’re
burning 20 million in a year to add an incremental 10 million of
ARR, you’re doing quite well and start planned. And then when
you start getting into two and a half, three, that’s a problem.
And then above three is just bad.
You spent spending 30 million to add 10 million in ARR. It means
it takes three years, or probably four or five, because
you’ll have turned to get that money back. Yeah. And that’s
just a lack of discipline. And how many VCs are we on the
boards? Or, you know, other investors? Are we on the board
and having that nuanced of a discussion? It’s always just
top line, top line, top line.
I think it’s very difficult, because I think the number of
qualified investors have gone way down as the surface area of
investing has gone way up. So again, just going back to this
conversation, this woman is staffing most of these venture
firms with their junior and mid level partners. And again, the
qualification to become a venture capitalist at this point
is not that you have an ability to pick or, you know, in David’s
case, have operated and actually run a business and then actually
have developed a methodical framework or Brad’s business,
which is Brad had to start from literally zero in the public
markets and work his way backwards to end up with 15 or
20 billion of assets. It’s none of that. It’s Are you a VP at an
XYZ unicorn that may also be poorly run. And all of a sudden
that, you know, gives you the qualification to go into a job
where, and it’s not their fault, where what they are told is what
you want is what we’re going to give you, which is the ability
to write, you know, x number of checks per year. That is
insanity. That’s not what makes a good investor. And then your
ability to then give advice, I don’t know, it’s probably zero,
or less than zero,
your ability to give advice is, I think we have to qualify bad
advice is being given. So the ability to give quality advice
as that was what’s missing in this formula.
I just think these people are really naive, like, you know,
and it’s not their fault. But, you know, they’re given way too
much rope to hang themselves with. And they’re and the the
unfortunate byproduct is going to be the, the companies who
gets bad advice or the bad businesses that get funded. And
that’s not what you know, an efficient capital market should
do.
So one of the things I’m seeing our portfolio companies do is
use burn multiple as a governor for how fast they’re going to
grow. So for example, they will say that the burn multiple
should not exceed two in the next quarter. So you know, we
want to so that the old way of doing it would be that the
company would just have a forecast and say, we’re going to
grow three x’s here, we’re going to grow error from 10 million to
30 million. And whatever that costs, it costs, right? That was
basically how companies did it. Now what I’m seeing from some of
our portfolio companies is they are saying, yeah, our goal is to
grow from 10 to 30. But we will not spend so much money that our
burn multiple exceeds two. So you know, if it turns out that
there’s a trade off here between growth, and burn burn is
going to win, we’re not going to exceed that level of that ratio
of spending. And that’s actually a good I mean, I’ve seen a few
companies implement that already. And it’s probably
something they should all be doing.
I mean, if these are pilots, they basically created a rule to
not stall the plane. Right, you got to keep a certain altitude a
certain speed. So what is the opportunity here, then if we’re
going to have too many companies, too high valuations,
if we’re going to hang around the rim and try to get some
rebounds here and try to find opportunities, what are the
opportunities? What are the layups here for capital
allocators? And for founders, if we have there are no great
advice for them, there’s nothing
there, there’ve never been layups. And the problem is, you
know, in up markets, whenever we think that there are, it ends up
being what causes our downfall later, because we we just take
the wrong signal away. I don’t think that there are, I don’t
want to be investing incremental capital into a late stage
startup that’s poorly run, that doesn’t have their margins in
line. And then having to work it out. Why do that? Again, I can
just go in the S&P 500 and get 8%. And yeah, it’s not 30%. But
it’s 8%. And I don’t have to deal with all this nonsense,
like, well, a bunch of people because you’re a crossover
investor, right? I mean, you have the ability to choose
between public, private, or wherever you want to play.
I actually think what I am is an investor. Right? Yeah, you
don’t have LPS for a VC fund like sacks. And I do. But but
this but this is my point, like, I think investing
irrespective of whatever stage you do it still fundamentally
comes down to the following, which is do you have the
judgment to understand whether these decisions are marginally
good, marginally average or marginally destructive for the
short, medium and long term of a business. And I just don’t think
that enough people steep themselves in the practice that
it takes to get good at that kind of a game. And I think what
these moments expose is that the status games that come
around investing, because it just seems like it’s easy, it
just seems like you don’t do much work. That’s what ruins
these periods. And the implications, I think, as Brad
said, is really right. It affects the employees, it
affects the entrepreneurs, it affects the startup culture, it
affects the incremental desire for people to take a shot at
things, you can overcome all of it, we have and we will again.
But I really think like to the entrepreneur, the message is if
you’re, you know, taking a term sheet, I think you have to have
better judgment to really look at that on that investor and say
is this person really qualified to help me? Because in these
moments, in the absence of help, you’re probably going to
basically have a valuation reset at the minimum case. And the
worst case is you go out of business.
What’s insightful about you said Shamath, and I’ll hand it to
you, Brad, is that a lot of the founders picked based on the
highest valuation who their next investor should be. And now we
see what a trap that is spread.
You know, the takeaway for me is we return to a place we’ve
always been, which is about selection. Right? Look at the
mean returns for ventures for 20 years, they’re lousy, lousy,
right? 90% of the of the spoils,
they barely, barely mapped to the public,
five to 10% of the investments. And that’s the way it’s always
been. Look at look at Buffett, right? by superior companies at
good prices. What are the two technology companies Buffett
bought in the public markets?
Tablet,
Apple and Snowflake,
Snowflake,
Apple and Snowflake, he doesn’t own a broad basket of law, a
long tail internet or long tail software. And so I think what
you’re going to see, and to Sax’s point, I think even
running a recipe on software as though all ARR is created equal.
I mean, I can show you five companies, each with 100 million
of ARR, each growing at 30%. And there’s massive dispersion in
future outcomes. Yeah, right. And so like, I just think that
this at the end of the day is a craft business. It’s an
essentialist business. It’s about finding and identifying
those very, very, very few companies that ever durably are
worth more than $10 billion. You know, on my screen today, Chamath
was just talking. There are four internet companies that are
green today. Amazon, Google, Apple and Facebook. Everything
else on my screen is bleeding
must own must own versus
everything else is red. And my growth internet stocks are down
400 basis points. Right? The market is voting with its wallet
where it wants to sit on the risk curve. Right. And I think
we’re just going to go there’s no new normal here. This is just
back to the future, right, is what we’ve always done. And, you
know, the reset is always painful. The only surprising
thing is how often we have to go through it.
If opportunities do arise, where will they where will they be
bred? I mean, I was watching Peloton, I always love that
company. I see the change in management, I see the
management, you know, thinking about profitability, thinking
about creating it into a marketplace, maybe having more
hardware available, disconnected from the software, etc. Do you
think there’s opportunities there? Or there will be
opportunities over the next year to buy some of the names that
aren’t the fangs?
What we do in the first instance, Jason, and listen, we
outperformed last year, because we owned quality, and we’re
short, lower quality stuff. Unfortunately, this year, the
market said, guess what, it’s all overvalued quality, low
quality doesn’t matter. We’re taking it all lower. And so for
us in moments like this, and I’ve lived probably through five
of them in the public markets, we always do the same thing.
degross, take risk down. First thing is, like have less chits
on the board. Number two, reduce the number of outliers pull in
the risk curve. Right? For me, I want to own five or six things,
because remember, I’m the biggest LP in the fund. This is
my money, I want to sleep well at night. And I want to protect
the foundations, the endowments, the good causes we represent. I
can’t do that with a company that has an unproven business
model. I may think that it’s going to be great in the future,
but I don’t know. So the problem with for the Pelotons of the
world, right, they may be incredible returners. But what
every portfolio manager on the planet is doing today is
compressing the number of names in their portfolio, saying what
are the companies I know with absolute certainty, whether
rates are two and a half, three and a half, four and a half,
five and a half is going to be worth more over the course of
the next two to three years. That’s what I want to own. Right.
Wait, what, what I was just gonna say, I don’t know about
Brad, but Jason, what you’re talking about is what a lot of
people do. You see a lot on Twitter, and I call it clapping
as a strategy. What about this? And what about that? And what
about if they do this? And what about clapping is not a
strategy? clapping is something people do at the blackjack
table, it turns out it doesn’t actually influence the cards.
Sure. And so I think you have to stop with the clapping as a
strategy, because
to be clear, that’s not my strategy. I was asking that as
the moderator. Is there just to be clear, I’m not advising that
as a strategy. I’m saying I think you’re representing a
psychological reaction that a lot of people have. And I think
what Brad is trying to tell you is clapping is not a strategy.
Yeah, no, I’m asking that on behalf of the audience. It is
not my belief, just to be clear. My commentary to the audience
is clapping is not a strategy. Yes, correct. Yes. If enough
people, though, do what you’re saying, Brad, and they just
retreat to quality, at some point that quality, those
quality companies would then become fully valued, maybe even
overvalued. And thus the cycle begins again or not. So how long
does that take?
No, you nailed it. What happened last year 2021. dispersion
collapsed. Go check out jam and ball who does incredible
software analysis on our team. dispersion collapse between the
best cohort and the worst cohort of software companies last year.
The first thing that happened is dispersion returns, we pay a
higher price for the best shit, and we pay a lower price for the
low quality stuff, right? Then when we start to recover, when
there’s more predictability in the world, when we resolve the
war, when we understand the path of inflation, right, the stuff
and close in on the risk curve, that’ll start being fully
valued. So then we will be brave enough to walk a little further
out on the ice on the lake, testing it, is it safe to walk
here. And then you walk out a little further. And sadly,
right, eventually, we’re in the exact same pattern we’ve been
before, which is we’ll know we’re at a market top five or
six or seven years from now, when we repeat the same asinine
behavior that we just went through when everybody becomes
complacent again, and overbidding this stuff way out
on the risk curve. I’m just suggesting to you the number one
question I get from GPs, venture capitalists and others right now
is when are we going to bounce back? Let me be absolutely
clear. There is no bouncing back to where we were the last 18
months. That was the outlier. That was the make believe. What
I hope and expect is that we can bat bounce back to the five year
average. But even to durably trade at the five year average,
we have to have a lot more clarity on the war in Ukraine on
inflation and rates.
So that’s a perfect place to pivot sacks. We’re now here and
I think this is the fourth or fifth episode where we’ve been
discussing the war and we flipped it today just to do
markets first. For a little change of pace. And since we had
Brad here, where are we at with the war? And what are your what
is your expectation of it wrapping up or it escalating?
Well, actually, there’s a tweet storm this morning, that
Chamath you sent to the group that from a Russian official,
and it seemed to indicate, well, it indicate what we’ve kind of
known for a few weeks now, which is what the broad contours of
what a peace deal would look like, which is there’s three
main pieces. Neutrality for Ukraine, the Russians insist
that it not be part of NATO, they get to keep Crimea, which
they annexed in 2014. That’s been a fait accompli. And then
some version of independence for these sort of breakaway
territories. In eastern Ukraine, the in the Donbass region,
everyone kind of knows that’s the the broad strokes of the
deal, then there’s, you know, a lot of details are going to
matter a lot to the people who live there, like is there this
land bridge from Crimea to Donbass, but frankly, don’t
matter as much to all of us, the United States of America. So the
question is, you know, what is the administration going to do
about it? Biden just went to Europe. And, you know, my
concern is that no one in Washington, and I talked about
this last week seems to be pushing for a ceasefire, it
seems like their preferred position is for Russia to bleed
out as as long as possible in Ukraine for the US to fund an
insurgency Allah Afghanistan, where, you know, these fighters
in eastern Ukraine are sort of like the Mujahideen. Is that the
right word? Well, sure. Because, you know, if they’re defending
their own land, and so we’re the Mujahideen, I mean, I know, but
why would you call it an insurgency? Well, defending
their land, if the government of Ukraine falls, and it becomes an
insurgency. So the point is that the administration, the question
is, what’s the administration’s endgame here? Do they want to
lead the world to a ceasefire? Or do they want to protract the
conflict to impose on the Russian state, a Afghan style,
you know, debilitating defeat to destabilize the Russian regime.
Neil Ferguson had a column this week in it’s his Bloomberg
column from the Brookings Institute at Stanford. No, he’s
from he’s from Hoover. Hoover, rather. Sorry. Yeah. So I’ll
read. I’ll read this book.
Hoover is at it. Can you just explain to people what the
Hoover Institute is and how that leans?
Hoover Institute for War and Peace, I would say it sort of
leans idealistic in foreign policy, I would describe Neil as
sort of the most realistic idealist. Got it. So context,
but he’s quite well sourced, I think, with, you know, and with,
you know, various people in Washington, Europe, and what he
wrote is, the US intends to keep this war going, the
administration will continue to supply the Ukrainians with
anti aircraft stingers, anti tank javelins, explosive
switchblade drones, it will keep trying to persuade other NATO
governments supply heavier defensive weaponry, and so on.
He says, Washington will revert to the Afghanistan after 1979
playbook of supplying an insurgency, only if the
Ukrainian government loses the conventional war. So the
concern here is that the US government has an incentive,
actually, that they don’t want a quick end to this war is
basically the theory is they want the Russian state to bleed
out and be destabilized.
In a way, it’s the one chance we have for like regime change
there without us actually starting a war is that they have
this self inflicted wound. That is the theory.
Yeah. And I think a lot of people are saying that that is
what a lot of people want in Washington. I don’t you know,
this is not like conspiracy theory, people are saying this
is our chance to topple the Russian state destabilize it.
There was a Rand Corporation. How do you survey a few years
ago, hold on, there’s a Rand Corporation studied on a few
years ago, that was commissioned by somebody probably in our
State Department, or someone like that, where they talked
about this, that if we want to destabilize the Russian regime,
Ukraine is the way to do it.
Right, they would fall for it, right, they would actually fight
that fight that is an unwinnable fight, we would basically be
putting an app, we’d be supporting an Afghanistan like
path for them to go down like we did. And they previously to
that, right?
And the problem, the problem that I see is just this, which
is, we’ve discussed on on this program, the downsides of this
war. First, it’s a humanitarian disaster. Second, we’ve talked
about the risks of recession later in the year. Third,
Freeberg talked about famine, the risk of famine later this
year, if the spring planning doesn’t happen. And then fourth,
we have this, always we have this risk that the war spins
out of control, and goes nuclear, right, and leads into
World War Three. Those are some vital American interests to
avoid all of those scenarios. I don’t see an equivalent vital
American interest in determining the exact nuances
of who rules the Donbass. In other words, the broad strokes
of this agreement are there. You know, what the US should be
doing is leading, they should be pushing for lead, not bleed,
lead the way to a ceasefire, not to inflict maximum damage on the
Russian regime,
which we don’t know exactly what their intent is, because they’re
doing this behind closed doors. Brad, what’s your take on this?
I think they’re David and I talked about this at dinner the
other night, I think there’s something bigger playing out
here. I mean, clearly, he’s the expert on real politic. And, you
know, but it seems to me that we have had decades of military
diplomacy. Right. And and most recently, the pal doctrine of
overwhelming force, we don’t want to make the same mistake we
made in Vietnam. So like, we’re going to go in with full force.
And, you know, basically, the public doesn’t support, you
know, military adventure ism anymore. Right. And so now we
have maybe we’ll call it the Blinken doctrine, which is the
pal doctrine equivalent, but for economic force. It’s the nuclear
economic weapon that is on full display by the West right now
that I think has really significant implications, right,
it’s reunited the West. And I don’t think this is just about
Putin. And I think the reason that the US and Western Europe
is slow playing this a bit is they’re sending a message to the
Chinese as well, which is that we will we are unified and we
will use an economic weapon of mass destruction. If, right, you
don’t play by global norms. And so the box I think we’re in from
a negotiating perspective, right, in Ukraine right now is
not a box around neutrality. I mean, neutrality is already
clear. I mean, we had Zelensky didn’t even ask for a no fly
zone. He’s not even asking for NATO membership. They’ve already
seeded neutrality. I think the real question is sanctions. I
don’t think the West wants to roll back sanctions. And I think
Putin saying I can’t hightail it out of here, unless you roll
back all the sanctions and give me a little bit of the Donbass.
And so watch the next week or two, like in any good
negotiation. Unfortunately, I think both sides are going to
amp up their current strategies, we may see missiles coming out
of Russia, and we may see European, complete European
embargo of Russian oil 3 million barrels a day. Those
will be the final straws right before we enter negotiations,
because then they can see the last things that they took as
part of the negotiation. But this I think is going to be all
about economic sanctions. And, and I think the West is playing
a really strong game. What I worry about, and Saks has talked
about this at length, is that we overreach, we overplay our hand
here in an effort to send a signal to other parties around
the world. Right. And that has fat tail risk associated with
it.
You’re referencing China and Taiwan.
Let me ask a question. How many of us woke up or this at the
beginning of this year, or in making our New Year’s
resolutions and said that we need to risk recession, famine
and war in order to destabilize and topple the Russian regime?
When did this become a vital American interest? No one at the
beginning of the year thought this was an important goal of
America. What’s more important is, is basically getting our
economy back on track and back on track after this long, this
long, this this plague we’ve had. I mean, nobody needed this
problem. And what the administration should have done
was use diplomacy and all the resources to try and prevent the
conflict. And now the conflict has occurred, we should be
pushing for a negotiated peace and ceasefire. We do not have a
vital national interest in the details of who rolls rolls the
Don bass.
Yeah, the problem with your setting up of that question is
that we did not start the war Putin did. Chamath, you’ve been
silent so far. What are your thoughts on this war that
we started the war?
Well, you’re saying did we wake up and say that we should do
this? We did not listen.
The people in the media woke up on February 24. And you think
Putin went mad. And there’s no pre history to this conflict.
Now, here’s the deal. Hold on a second. This is a war of
Russian aggression. It’s true that Putin started it. He’s the
invader. However, there were things we could have done to
prevent or to avoid this war. And American diplomacy
completely failed. And we even discussed it the month before
this war started. We talked about how the US could have
given a written guarantee to Russia that Ukraine would not be
part of NATO. Just this week, Zelensky in an interview with
Freed Zakaria admitted he was told by Blinken, you will not be
part of NATO. But we don’t want to admit that publicly. What
games were they playing? What is the point of playing that kind
of game with a grave issue of war and peace? Why didn’t
Blinken say publicly what he said to Zelensky? This
administration did not do everything it could do to
prevent war. And now we are faced with all of these
existential risks. Why? For what reason?
The reason is that it gave the United States an opportunity to
topple Russia. I mean, exactly. And who have us thought we
needed that at the beginning of this year? Well, I think that
you know, the thing to keep in mind, and again, I don’t I don’t
I’m not saying that this is right, but I’m just game
theorizing that these are like, you know, grudges that these
guys have held for a very long time. And I think it started
when they were in the Obama White House, and it carried
over to now. And I think they saw an opportunity to basically
execute a strategy that essentially now I think we’re
moving into the second phase of this war, which is effectively
trying to bait Russia into doing something really egregiously
bad. And that is terrible, David, to your point, I think
we’re willing to, you know, sacrifice a lot. I think we’ve
decided that implicitly by based on the actions of the American
government. And, and it’s weird, it’s like we’re trying to get
Russia to react. And so the rhetoric, in fact, the rhetoric
since that, do you guys remember, I think it was only 10
days ago that both Russia and Ukraine said the surface area of
a deal is pretty much in sight. Oh, Friedberg from the top rope
coming in. Look at you, Friedberg. I mean, like you, you
look like an everyman. I mean, I’m so proud of you. Are you
actually driving your own car, gas guzzling car, SUV in the
you should be
in that tank. Is that Putin’s gas?
I only use ethanol I make in vats in my backyard.
When I use solar panels that are handcrafted in my way to find a
luke oil gas station filled up.
What I was saying guys was that, you know, from the 10 days from
when, you know, both sides, Russia and Ukraine were like,
Hey, you know, we think we’re basically there, we have a deal.
The rhetoric has gotten really insane. You know, yesterday, I
think it was like, the United States said, you know, we, we
think that Russia should be kicked out of the G 20. Then
Russia responded and said, I’m only going to sell that gas and
settle it in rubles. You know, all of a sudden, other actors,
China and Saudi Arabia are in the game. Now, you know, China
and Saudi Arabia are negotiating settling a huge oil trade in
new one. Why in the last 10 days of all these things happened
when we were so close to getting something done? I think the best
explanation is that we are willing to, I guess we’ve
decided, I mean, we, none of us have decided, but American
government said that some amount of sacrifice is okay. If it
could trigger a Russian escalation, which could then
further destabilize that country. And I think they
believe that that’s more important than anything else.
I think we, you know, from where I sit, I think we can take
putting out his word that he actually cares about
reunification. And that’s not to say he’s crazy, David. And I
don’t think we can control his behavior. I think you’re
Wednesday, or his word reunification.
Never said that, Jason. And also just today, the Russian
military, the tweet that I sent you guys was from the Russian
military. And that was an official statement. And I don’t
think he they would be allowed without Putin’s explicit sign
off. They no longer talked about denazificating Ukraine or
demilitarizing Ukraine. They simply focused it on the Don
boss. And to use your son zoo argument, it’s almost like
they’re trying to construct their own golden bridge to exit
in a way where they can claim victory to the Russian people to
explain the 10s of 1000s of, you know, Russian military people
that have been killed in this whole conflict, right, because
they have an explanation that they have to give. But in all of
this, I think that we’re, we’re probably exposing a very high
risk game of poker that we’re playing, which is it seems that
the US government is focused more on the destabilization of,
of Russia than they are in getting this conflict behind us.
I mean, he did. He did say in his speech, since time
immemorial, the people living in the southwest of what has
historically been Russian land have called themselves Russians
and Orthodox Christians. That’s Don bass. Yeah, I know. But he
is
there’s been a Jason, there’s been a civil war going on since
- In this Don bass region between Ukrainians and these
sort of these Russian speakers. And now that civil wars as this
a Balkan style civil war that has now escalated with, you
know, Ukraine and Russia getting in and now the whole West
potentially could get in. This is a very dangerous situation.
We should not let spin out of control.
I’m agreeing with that. You guys asked me, did he ever talk about
reunification? He did. He did in his speech was not one of his
stated war objectives. Now you could keep accusing him of being
a liar. But look what his objective is, just take him at
his word that he believes these areas are Russian, and they
should be considered
area where they are predominantly Russian speakers.
Look, and I’m not taking a side in who should rule the Don bass.
Okay, yeah, I think it’s a complicated, ethnic strife sort
of issue, like we saw in the Balkans all the time between the
Russians who live there and the Ukrainians who live there. What
I do know is it’s not worth risking war three, over 100%
agreement, 100% agreement,
sex, let me Can I ask you a question? So how is Putin going
to withdraw without 100% lifting of the sanctions? And how is the
West possibly going to trust him to withdraw? Right? Well,
while taking all the sanctions off, that seems to me like, when
I try to construct the Golden Bridge, in my mind, it comes
down to, you know, like, how do we how do we whack up the
sanctions? Do we take some of them off? Say prove to us be out
for x period of time, and then we’ll roll the other ones off.
Because these sanctions are not going to be rolled back in the
next three months based on some ceasefire.
I agree with that. I don’t know that Putin can expect the
sanctions to be lifted, or that he can effectively negotiate for
that. I think, again, where I think the the peace deal is, is
that we’ve known all along what it’s going to be Ukraine will
agree to neutrality in exchange for some security guarantees
from the West. Russia will get to keep Crimea because that’s
been a fait accompli since the annexation 2014. And there will
be some sort of regional autonomy for these sort of
Russian speaking areas in the Donbass, which, by the way, we
could have had that too. There was a deal called Minsk two
since 2015. That simply hasn’t been implemented. So, you know,
I think that those are the broad strokes of the deal. And then
there’s questions about, well, is there a land bridge from
Crimea to the Donbass? And, you know, what weapons exactly does
Ukraine get to get from the United States or get to keep? I
mean, so look, those details matter a lot to the people who
live there. But the broad strokes of this, I think are
pretty well understood.
I’m not betting this way with with our book. But if I had to
guess, we are going to have a period of significant escalation
on both sides. Before they both get to the table. Macron said
this week that we still have the Europeans have not made a
decision about the embargo of Russian oil that will collapse
the Russian economy and oil will go to 180 or $200 a barrel.
I think that’s a real likelihood. And the second one
is I think the Russians will amp up military aggression in some
face saving measure and to have more to negotiate with. So maybe
to answer my own question is if there is an oil embargo, then
you take the oil embargo off, right as part of the economic
sanction whacking up of the sanctions, because that’s really
the nuclear option against the Russians economically. But it’s
a, you know, unfortunately, I think we have to be prepared for
this to get worse before it gets better, because it makes sense
from just a game theory for both sides to grab as much as they
can, right before they sit down at the table, so they have more
shit to give to each other.
Right. But the problem is, if both sides keep asking, I agree
with that fundamental analysis is that neither Putin nor
Zelensky can be trusted on their own to basically make
peace because they want to push their advantage. If either one
believes that they’re winning on the battlefield, they’re going
to push their advantage to grab as much as they can to then
negotiate from a position of greater strength. The problem is
that they’re in an escalatory spiral, where if you know one or
both of them miscalculate, we never get that deal. And I think
the longer the war drags on, the harder it is to make a deal not
easier. One of the I’d say one of the disturbing things that
came out over the past week was in that interview that I
mentioned, where freed Zakaria interviewed Zelensky. Zelensky
said, he said that it’s either going to get a peace deal, or
World War Three. And I’m listening to this thinking, wait
a second. You know, that, that is a pretty scary posture for
him to be taking. And furthermore, who appointed him
leader of the free world, you know, the decision to have war
three is not his decision. He is not the President United
States, we did not vote for him. We may think he’s heroic, we may
think he deserves our support. But he does not get to turn this
into war three for us. The American people did not choose
that. And this is where I go back to Biden and the
administration and their leadership, what are they
pushing for? Are they pushing for a protracted, never ending
Afghan style war in Ukraine? Or are they going to lead the
situation to some sort of negotiation or ceasefire? And I
just think if we’re considering the interest of the United
States, we would not let this decision purely be Zelensky’s,
this guy’s willing to entertain war three, that can’t be
acceptable to us.
But what what what what is his worst alternative? I mean, like
he’s losing his country. So of course, he wants to say, the
thing that would scare us into action, potentially, right? So
he has nothing to lose. So right.
That’s what we can’t let him decide for us.
He’s not deciding. He’s, he’s using rhetoric to get us to talk
about it, which he just won. Like he, you can see that what
he’s saying, right? Yeah, because you’re talking about it.
So I think the I think the bigger question in all of this
is, when is the United States willing to draw a really hard
line. So there was a another thing that happened, which is
that, you know, Biden essentially said, like, you
know, if they use chemical weapons, we will react sort of
in kind, right? There was some some version of that. It’s a
red line, basically, he said, yes. And, and then he also said,
you know, depending on, you know, how they use nuclear
weapons, we could theoretically respond. So just the rhetoric is
ratcheting way, way up. And that is surprising to me, because I
would have thought we had a deal in sight, just get it done. Be
pregnant.
You’re assuming that we have the influence, you assume, David,
that we have the influence to actually cut a deal. You were
saying yourself in the last couple of months, that the US
power has waned, and that we don’t have influence. So which
is it? I believe we have the influence to to get facilitated
deal. Listen, let me give you an example. We are giving Zelensky
and the Ukrainians all these incredible weapons. What are the
conditions on that? If Zelensky is unwilling to make a
reasonable peace deal? Do we do we have any conditions and are
giving him these weapons? Why wouldn’t we insist Zelensky?
Listen, we support you. We basically are against this
Russian aggression, you should have the right to defend your
homeland and drive them out. But we also want you to take a
reasonable peace deal, if one is available, and we need you to
specify what that is. You’re only exercising that kind of
discretion. I don’t think so.
I think you’re assuming that Biden is blocking this when in
fact, it might be that Putin is and I believe you’re taking
Putin’s sort of position here over our own presidents. I think
you need to know for a second that we don’t want to have this
continual escalate. You actually think there’s a world in which
Biden wants to see this escalate? I don’t think that
that’s the case. I think that we don’t have influence. We don’t
have the David, we do not have the influence today that we did.
It is no longer Neil Ferguson’s days, you know, gets to dictate
to the world what’s going on here. We no longer have that
about this. Israel, Putin wants to talk to Macron in France, not
us, because we’re not seen as an honest broker. But But look,
tomorrow, we don’t have the influence we once had. Okay,
let me explain. I’m not saying we can dictate the outcome. Okay.
But we can push for a negotiated settlement instead of a
protracted we can lead not bleed. Okay. Chamath laid it out.
Neil Ferguson laid it out. The Rand Corporation laid it out.
These there is a significant chance that there are
definitely actors in the State Department who want to see an
Afghan style situation insurgency play out in Eastern
Europe. That’s their goal. Okay. Now, I don’t know what Biden is
thinking. But he has made no statement. To the contrary, what
have we done to help lead the situation to a negotiated
settlement? Name one thing.
Well, I don’t think we’re in the room, David. But Biden is in
your honor, I read all their public statements. I don’t see
anything. I don’t think they want to negotiate to the press
with Putin. I don’t think they want to go to Europe right now.
I think that says enough about what his intent is. He’s in
Poland, right? He’s going to Poland. He’s in Poland. We’re
scaling up our military presence. Listen, yeah. I mean,
I don’t. All I’m saying is, look, I don’t know exactly what
Biden is saying or doing behind closed doors. What I’m saying is
that the US should be playing a constructive role to get to a
negotiated ceasefire, not indulging this sort of
fantastical thinking, that we can basically perpetrate a
regime change operation in Russia with you on that. I agree
with you on that.
I, I’m worried that there may be a small strain of that
probability in the range of outcomes here. And I didn’t
think that before. I really thought that, okay, maybe we
were a little bit on the outside looking in. But it looks like,
you know, we’re pretty close to a deal, these guys will get in a
room, they’ll, you know, chop it up, and it’ll be done. And
instead, honestly, if you just look at the headlines and the
rhetoric, and the words from all these three leaders in the last
10 days, it’s been, it’s been in the other direction. And so you
have to wonder what is the point of all of this right now, other
than
crescendoing, like Brad said,
it’s a, I listened to Blinken over the weekend. And he talked
about what I think he defined what is this new doctrine of
economic statecraft, he said, our objective is, we have the
power to impose overwhelming costs on our target, economic
costs. And he said, our cause, Putin’s actions are remembered
as a strategic failure, not regime change. That’s what’s
within our control. That is very different. Bush wanted regime
change in Iraq, and we executed it through the pal doctrine of
overwhelming military force. I think that this is a doctrine of
overwhelming economic force that is meant to not only signal to
the Russians, but every other rogue dictator in the world. If
you go rolling into your neighbor, uninvited, you can
count on the fact that there’s going to be massive economic
sanctions, because our military deterrence is no longer a
deterrent. Everybody knows we’re not going to go defend Taiwan,
everybody knows we’re not going to send our military to Ukraine.
So we have to demonstrate that we actually have economic
resolve, not these poo poo sanctions we’ve been having
around the world for the last 20 years. And if that is the
lasting impact on this, I think you’re right, you know, that we
turn this into an economic nuclear weapon. Yeah, better
than sending our kids around the world to get killed. I think
you’re absolutely right. And I think Tony is very smart to say
what he said. The, the one thing that I would want, though,
on top of that, tell me if you agree, is just to ratchet down
our rhetoric, which we can control.
And maybe to, I mean, why not say that, listen, we’re willing
to put these sanctions on the table, we’re willing to
basically re institute economic ties with Russia, if we can get
to a satisfactory outcome,
but you don’t want to reward. I would say is we’re making a big
assumption to say that there’s not back channel diplomacy going
on from the Israelis, the Turks, the French, you know,
having those conversations on our behalf, right? Like, I
don’t, I honestly, I don’t know that there, that’s a high
probability that we’re not sending those signals. But to
your point, I just don’t know. I don’t know.
Either, but I don’t know either. But But here’s what I would say
is, look, I can only judge from the public statements. And I
think there is signal in these public statements. And the
statements are all one way, there is no olive branch. It’s
all it’s all basically about escalation. Just like in January
before the war, what were the State Department’s statements
about the situation? They said that NATO’s door is open and
will remain open, even though they told Zelenskyy in private
that he would not be joining NATO. Okay, that was an
astounding revelation that came out this week on the Fried
Zakaria show. Number two, Blinken was saying that there
was no change in the American position, and there would be no
change. He said, these are all public statements, that the US
would never recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea
never. You know, he said that we went into these peace talks to
represent our core values, there’s no change on that. So
in other words, it’s been the position of the United States to
be hardline with Russia to basically engage in no
compromise whatsoever. And it’s basically a double down, it’s a
double down. You assume, David, you don’t know, those are the
public statements. I know, but you’re assuming that there’s no
back channels going on. And just to just I wanted to make
one quick point, Chamath, which was, you know, what if we offer
to take the sanctions off, and then we are training Putin that
these kind of misadventures, get him something, Don Bass, etc.
And that the sanctions roll off. So isn’t there a possibility
Chamath, that if we don’t keep the sanctions up, we’re actually
rewarding his behavior?
I’m a huge guys. Look, I’ve been the first person in the front of
the line on sanctions. I thought this was the most brilliant
approach to this whole thing. And I still believe that
sanctions work. And I think that this will cripple that country.
What I’m saying, though, is that there are these moments where
instead of then sticking to the rhetoric that Tony talked about
what he said, I don’t know, Brad, where Tony said this, this
weekend, but like, sticking to that, there are these added
flourishes that I think are unnecessary. So what I mean by
that is the talk about, you know, us reacting, or
retaliating for the use of chemical weapons. Biden made a
campaign vow, I don’t know if you guys remember this about
nuclear weapons, where, you know, he was very clear that,
you know, it is a mechanism to demonstrate that this deterrence
exists. And instead, he actually caved. And instead, he put out
this carefully worded statement, which kind of walked back the
campaign vow earlier this week, and I’ll just read it to you.
I’ll just read what the Wall Street Journal said. It said,
by President Biden, stepping back from a campaign vow, has
embraced the long standing us approach of using the threat of
a potential nuclear response to deter conventional and other
nuclear dangers in addition to nuclear ones. During the 2020
campaign, Biden promised to work towards a policy in which the
sole purpose of us nuclear, the nuclear arsenal would be to
deter or respond to an enemy nuclear attack. Instead, now it
holds that the fundamental role of the nuclear arsenal will be
to deter, but that it leaves the opening to respond and use it in
extreme circumstances. So these are big changes. And if our
whole goal is to just focus the service area to an economic set
of sanctions, these are somewhat unnecessary. Would we all agree
we don’t need to talk about nuclear policy. Yeah, Biden was
right on the campaign trail, the United States of America should
never use nukes, except if nukes are used on us. Come on, we know
that. Yeah. And we’re talking about changing that now. That’s
insane. No, we changed it. We changed. Look, it shows that
there there’s an influence in our government, our State
Department of certain hardline elements who want this very
tough policy that includes destabilizing the Russian regime
and maybe toppling Putin. I’m just saying that objective is
not worth all the existential risks that we’re now facing.
All right, do we want to touch on the CCP tax cuts? We want to
wrap we’re at 80 minutes.
I mean, the the CCP tax cuts harkens me back, Brad, you can
react to this because you lived it with me. 2018 19. I’ll say it
again, we were in this unique moment where, you know, we were
not sure whether there was runaway rampant inflation. And
in q4 of 2018. The Fed basically said, Okay, you got us, you
know, the boogeyman exists, we’re gonna go tame inflation,
and they ran forward and raised rates. And lo and behold, the
Chinese economy turned over in q1 of 2019. We had like a, you
know, kind of a blippy little recession. And we had to
overcome it, because China became stimulative. Now, here we
are, again, we’re worried about this inflationary boogeyman. And
the Chinese government basically extended these tax cuts,
increased the tax cuts, and essentially said, we’re going to
be very stimulative in the economy, especially through the
back half of the year. Now, China, again, is a massively
export driven economy, right? So the reality is that as goes
China, so goes the rest of our economies. And so I think that
it’s a setup where how can the United States be under so much
inflationary pressure, where China is effectively telling you
that we are in a, in a contraction and a recessionary
period. And so, if that’s where China is, there’s a risk that we
may already be there or entering that. And so I think it’s a
little, you know,
contorted, you hit two really important points. Number one,
which we didn’t get to earlier. I tweeted a few weeks ago, the
Fed’s probably behind the curve on recession, not inflation.
Right? We have massive demand destruction going on right now
in the US economy.
Massive
the producer
define what that means, Brad, define what that means.
So I mean, if you just think about what a $6 gas mean, what
is no stimmy checks mean? What is the fact that you actually
have to go and get a job again mean, you know, we’re, we’re
rolling back trillions of dollars off the Fed balance
sheet, I’ll tell you what it means is that people can’t spend
as much money. Just the increase in the 30 year mortgage means
you’re buying power in December four months ago, to buy a house
and you if you could afford 1200 bucks a month that buying power
budget $350,000 house today, it buys you a $295,000 house
people’s ability, right to have money to spend money is getting
crushed. So I think we are going to face an economic slowdown. If
you look at the PMI. So this was the inflation read in January,
little people didn’t really notice it. PMI in January came
in at point two versus the consensus estimate estimate of
point six. That means the producer level of inflation was
meaningfully less than we expected. If you look at
consumer confidence, it’s plummeted one of the four
biggest drawdowns over the last 20 years, retail sales in UK
this morning crashing consumer confidence in the UK crashing
the Chinese government sees this we’re we’re not surprised to look
at the what’s going on in the world with energy prices. We’ve
never had oil over 120 bucks and not gone into a recession. We’re
facing a global slowdown. That will have big implications for
inflation big implications for rates. But China sees this
coming and says we’re going to get ahead of this. We’ve got a
People’s Congress in November, we promised him five and a half
percent GDP growth. 3 trillion of that is export driven. That
means if Europe and the United States catches a cold, they
catch the flu. Okay, so they have to do everything in their
power. This is why they’re not going to supply the Russians
with weapons, right? Because it’s economically assassinated
themselves. Right? So we have this interconnected world, this
idea that we’re de globalizing, what we do doesn’t impact
anybody else like that ship is sailed a long time ago. And the
Chinese see this. That’s why I think there’s also a probability
by the Middle East this summer, the Fed in the United States is
saying we now see a balanced risk between growth and
inflation.
sacks, let’s get you in on this. Just as we wrap here, the
Chinese Communist Party premier talked about tax custs. And this
is a quote fertilizer applied directly to the roots of the
economy tax rebates look like reductions, but actually are an
addition. Today, give back tomorrow, you get more in
returns. Does this mean the United States, people will go
back and get jobs because they need to have more money and that
maybe we should be looking at, you know, tax cuts at some
point.
Listen, Jake, I think we got big problems here at home in the
United States, Brad and Chamath, they’ve laid out these gigantic
economic risks that are facing the country. You know, I tweeted
at the beginning of the year, January 24. The President’s main
job is to ensure peace and prosperity. And Biden’s
popularity was already plummeting. I think this is when
his poll numbers were at 38%. But if he gets us into war and
recession, he ain’t seen nothing yet. This war, the longer it
drags on, the longer it basically can spin out of
control and become something worse that sucks us in, the
longer it creates the risk of basically causing a recession in
the United States. We need the American we need the Biden
administration to help try and lead to a better outcome here
instead of ratcheting up the rhetoric.
All right, folks, there you have it. That’s your all in podcast
for this week. Thanks so much to Brad Gerstner for joining us and
filling in for the Sultan of Science BG. Thanks, bro. And a
lot of great announcements here. Brad will also be joining us for
the all in summit. We’re about to wrap up tickets. We’ve
announced a bunch of great speakers for the event may 1516
and 17 in Miami. You can just do a search for the all in summit.
We have given out. We’ve sent 200 emails to people who asked
for scholarships and 100 of them have taken the tickets. 500 of
the 650 tickets or so are accounted for we’ll be wrapping
up registration in the next week or two. And we look forward to
seeing you all at the New World Symphony in South Beach.
You got any announcements of people who else is appearing? Oh
my lord, we have great announcements keys were boy is
coming. Joe Lonsdale is coming. Nate Silver is coming.
Nate Silver. I love Nate Silver.
Well, we decided Chamath we would have people do 15 to 20
minute, Ted style talks like position papers. And so who
else do we have doing that? Tim urban of weight but why he was a
brilliant speaker and writer. Nate Silver is going to do that.
And then Antonio is coming. He was just on. And he was just on
Rogan show. And so we’re going to have these like 20 minute
kind of hits, then the besties will sit with them. We’ll do
those back to back. Kimball Musk is going to come and talk about
his DAO that he’s doing for nonprofits, Brad, we’re going to
talk about what topics so we’re collecting all this talent, and
then we’ll figure out what positions are going to play in
the show, and what the themes will be. But the themes will
match what we’ve been talking about here. And we don’t want to
pre set the themes six or seven weeks, seven weeks out from the
event, because we don’t know what the world will look like
then. And then Freeberg said he wanted to do a position paper
and actually give a 20 minute talk. So besties will have that
ability. And besties will start the event and any event, tons of
different speakers rotating in and out talking about the most
important topics of our time, but I would like to have Peter
there. Can you get Peter to come? He’s maybe the most
iconoclastic, please. I’m just not I’m just not I have to get
over my uncertainty that this whole conference thing is really
a grift. It’s not a grift. We’re putting all the money is going
back into the event. And we gave 200 scholarships, there’ll be no
profit from the
there needs to be a really nice swag bag. And I think it’s
already at $600 a person I just spent three or 400. What is the
material of the hoodie? All right.
It’s gotta be a cashmere hoodie if to be on brand.
To be able to buy up to the to the special hoodie,
Brad, I just spent $600,000 per gift bag for 600 gift bags. Okay,
it’s like 400 grand and gift bags. And Chamath wants to put a
$6,000. So I just wanted to know what the material was of the
hoodie in the bag. That’s all I’m just asking. This is my
life, Brad, I am busting my ass to put this event on and
complaining about the gift bag. sax is complaining on me making
a dollar from it. And freebergs having a panic attack that we
don’t have enough great speakers. And I’m doing all the
work. It’s my whole fucking life. I appreciate you, Jacob.
I’m going to say some nice stuff to me. You did say some nice
stuff. I want to get on board with you getting a fee for your
hard work. You know, I don’t need an hourly wage, you know,
$15 an hour. I’m not your wage slave, David Sachs. I’m working
hard here. Working hard, but I just want to be appreciated. I
don’t think you should have like a cotton blend is my I think it’s
safer.
By the way, Brad, do you have any thoughts on the sushi? Is
there should we be using brown rice and not the line caught
tuna?
No, just make sure there’s gold leaf on the sushi.
No, literally, we’re spending, I think, for 300 or 400,000 per
party. It’s over a million dollars in parties. And I’m
talking to talent bookers about serious talent coming to
perform. Drake, can you get drink? How about that’s $3
million. dual depot $2 million. I’m deep in $2 million. That’s
what I got. How much is doja cat? She’s great. I think those
are all seven figures. I would like to anyway, what I’m trying
to use use of that. I mean, that would make it an incredible
party. Oh, God. I mean, I really would like to get by. So how
much is Drake again? $2 million. I heard for 20 bags and get
Drake. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Cancel the bag. Give it all to Drake.
So you guys are saying and all the work I do, I should take $2
million and hand it to fucking Drake. Yes, yes.
Drake is more valuable than you 25 years of working on events
and media Brad. And these these are my friends. We’re like,
take the $2 million put in your pocket and finally make a profit
on your work. And just hand $2 million in a bag.
Drake, we don’t need the bag.
Plane.
Jet card. Do we get to work with Drake on which songs he’s he
would sing?
He does like a medley of like three what I would like to do
is have three songs for two. Come on. I think it’s basically
like 100,000 a minute. I think that’s what you’re in for 100,000
per minute. 20 minutes.
That seems egregious. No, I mean, these guys get paid bang
when I hired Snoop. He did like 20 songs for me. I mean, it was
unbelievable. And what was that two or three hours show? 300?
Sax because he forgot he was there. Yeah, he had a great
time. Oh my god, man. He was blowing this joint that was so
powerful that I was 10 feet away and I got stoned it mean it
was like he walked in it was like I remember how it was like
20 Super Bowl shows. Good stuff. All right, everybody. Love you
besties. Love you, Brad.
Let your winners ride.
Rain Man David.
We open source it to the fans and they’ve just gone crazy with
it. Love you.
What what your winners ride?
Besties are gone.
That’s my dog taking a notice in your driveway.
We should all just get a room and just have one big huge orgy
because they’re all just like this like sexual tension that
they just need to release somehow.
What you’re about to be
waiting to get
keys are