All right, everybody, welcome to the all in podcast. And with me
again, this week, the Sultan of science, the Prince of panic
attacks, the Queen of quinoa, David Friedberg, the dictator
Chamath Palihapitiya wearing a beautiful Mr. B sweater, and
David Sachs, the rain man himself. Thanks for coming to my
Laura Piana dinner on Tuesday, Jacob. That was wonderful.
Thanks. At least one bestie showed up for you. Wonderful,
wonderful dinner. I sat as far away from the Laura Piana people
as possible in the arranged seating. Thank you for that. I
guess maybe you were like, I’m going to contain the damage.
Bernard Arnault said, put put the all caps got the end and I
said, Okay, yeah, he still heard me. I was like, what’s the
amuse bouge? joke at dinner every time he said something he
yelled like he was in
I want another butterscotch pudding.
The butterscotch pudding is delightful. Sean’s like, I’m
four feet away from me. Jake out. You can take the cap slot.
Sean was so embarrassed. Chef Sean crushed it. Chef Sean
crushed it. Sean crushed it once again. Were you sounding
alarms when the restaurant like almost ran out of something?
Alert, alert, alert. Restaurant is running low on coffee. We’re
dangerously low on caviar on this one.
Let your winners ride.
Rain Man, David Satterthwaite.
All right, everybody, welcome to the pod where we, you know, try
to inform you. We try to make some jokes here. I just want to
make what is a little bit of an opening statement here. It’s not
an apology. And it’s not a victory lap in any way. But
there’s been a lot of attention, I think, on the last episode of
the pod, and perhaps some tweeting from two of the four
besties this past weekend. I saw and I you know, I’ll let you
speak for yourself, your sacks, and we’re going to get into the
timeline of what’s occurred. And then what are potential outcomes
here and solutions to the banking issues that we’ve
witnessed in what is a week since the bank run on Silicon
Valley Bank and the shutdown on Friday. But what I saw, and
again, speaking only for myself here was absolutely terrifying
up close and personally, watching people pulling money
out of banks and watching people have to set up loans to hit
their payroll. And this was like one of those surreal moments in
a in a movie where like a meteor is coming towards Earth, and you
see it in the telescope, and nobody else sees it or only a
small number of people in the observatory see it. And I think
part of the reason people listen to this podcast is
because we are insiders. And speaking again, just for myself,
I’m always trying to be exceptionally candid and
transparent with the audience. Additionally, I make jokes. So
sometimes you might laugh during this podcast, or you might laugh
when you’re reading my tweets. And that’s part of what I do.
Now, I also realized that we have an audience now, that is
larger than I think any of us expected for this podcast, I
certainly magnitude larger than I expected. And frankly, I
didn’t know if this podcast was going to make it past 50 or 100
episodes. And my Twitter following count doubled since we
started this podcast. And
you tried to ruin the pot.
I think it was because of the caps locks. But anyway, putting
all that aside, what I would like to say as well is like, we
are living in a situation that is unprecedented. I think the
alarm bell I sounded, you know, was because I saw a fire. We’ll
get into the timeline here. But I sounded that alarm bell after
Silicon Valley Bank was put into receivership. And when I
saw additional bank runs occurring, I wouldn’t change it.
I think these were the right the right thing to do was to inform
folks. Now I did use all caps, perhaps a little too much. That
was a little bit of a bit if people didn’t understand that
maybe I need to adjust my communication style now that
this thing is so popular. But I stand by my mode of operating in
the world, which is I always want to be candid with people. I
always want to tell the truth. And yeah, sometimes I make jokes
about life and, you know, dealing with the stressful
situations. That’s it. It’s not an apology. It’s more of an
explainer. And yeah, maybe I need to adjust the caps lock or
how I deliver stuff. But I stand by the message of what I said.
And I think it’s important for us to maybe look at the series
of events and misinformation that has spread because there
are people literally blaming venture capitalists for the bank
run that is now systematic. And the balance sheets of multiple
banks around the world. And I think sex would be great for you
to maybe just comment on the week that was and the timeline
of events. Yeah. So as usual, you’re not apologizing. No,
absolutely not apologizing. But we’ll recognize that this
platform is bigger. And that may be on the margins, I could
adjust my communication strategy. But Chris, there’s a
lot of people who don’t know that I make jokes. And maybe
people don’t understand what I’m joking and when I’m serious,
right. And so Jason, what would you change?
Was there anything you change?
I think I might not have used a Mad Max image and gift about the
end of the world. Because people are too stupid to understand
that’s a joke and a fictional movie. I see. So you find
yelling effective. It depends. Well,
Jay Cal, I agree that I don’t think you have anything to
apologize for in terms of the substance of what you’re trying
to get across. I personally could have done without the all
caps. It was a bit. Yeah, what you’re basically saying is
nobody should listen to you because you’re not that
important. And I wholeheartedly agree with that.
No, I’m saying understand, I might make a joke. Consider me
more, of course, more category. Yeah. All right, let’s go back.
Let’s go back and look at the timeline. Because there are now
serious accusations. And I would call it really scapegoating of
and it wasn’t just you, it was me and Bill Ackman. In fact, the
Wall Street Journal editorial board, which I respect a lot,
mischaracterized what me and Ackman were trying to do in
terms of drawing attention to a regional banking crisis in
progress, a run on the banks, they called it spreading panic,
I don’t know how you tweet or publicly discuss a run on the
bank that’s currently happening needs to be addressed with an
immediate federal intervention. I don’t know how you can discuss
it without then having someone else mischaracterize it as
trying to spread a panic. But Jake, how the Wall Street
Journal editorial board didn’t mention you. So you’re off the
hook. They didn’t know who you are. Thank you. But no, but
seriously, so I went back and looked at the timeline of all of
this. And so first of all, we have to understand that this
banking crisis now has swept in five banks, five bank failures.
First, there was Silvergate, but everyone dismissed that because
it was some weird crypto bank. Then it was SVB. But everyone
sort of dismissed it because they said it was based on
panicky VCs rather than a systemic problem in the banking
system. Then it was Signature Bank, which got seized on
Sunday, which I think utterly refuted the idea that this was
just a Silicon Valley problem. Then you had the Fed step in and
backstop First Republic, which would have been the next
domino to fall if it wasn’t backstopped. And then five, you
had Credit Suisse, basically, again, avoid an outright failure
because they got backstopped by the Swiss government. So we now
have five banks in roughly a week. And these are not small
banks. Credit Suisse is a GSIB, a globally systemically
important bank. And the other ones are top 20, top 30 type
banks, we’re talking about hundreds of billions of dollars
in deposits. So clearly, there’s a larger phenomenon going on
here. And frankly, it’s being caused not by like anything VCs
did, because VCs are just depositors. We’re just one class
of depositors. And depositors are not to blame for what’s
going on here. What’s going on is that these banks have huge
unrealized losses on their balance sheet. And the losses
have come from the sun spike in interest rates. That’s what’s
going on. The sun spike in interest rates is because we’ve
had the most rapid Fed tightening cycle in our
lifetimes. In the last year, the Fed funds rates gone from
roughly zero to almost 5%. That has broken a lot of things. And
the banks which have broken first are the ones that had
pre existing problems. And they had horrible risk management.
But that’s who gets broken first in a stress test, right is the
most poorly run banks, the ones with pre existing issues. But
just because they went first doesn’t mean that others don’t
have similar kinds of issues. Now, I’m not saying this in any
way to be panicky, where those banks will be fine. But there
are larger issues in the banking system that are worth talking
about. And to the point about whether VCs could have spread
this, Jake, how you’re absolutely right about the
timeline. I mean, I went back and checked. I personally never
tweeted anything about SVB until Friday afternoon, when SVB was
already in receivership. And the run on the bank had already
started with signature and First Republic, and we could see it
with our own eyes. And then this pod didn’t drop the one where we
talked about this problem didn’t drop until Saturday morning when
the banks were already closed. And by Sunday night, the Fed had
acted and basically implemented our recommendations, which was
to basically intervene. So I don’t know how you can blame the
search for scapegoats, I think is getting out of control. And
it’s just not factually accurate.
And you know that it’s convenient to make tech, which
is hated right now, Chamath and Friedberg, you know, the
scapegoat venture capital is obviously the part of tech that
people might hate the most or the easiest target. But let’s
talk about the Fed raised those rates because of inflation and
inflation happened because of out of control spending due to
COVID. And then the second administration, so you had a
republican administration that spent a lot of money and then a
democratic administration, Chamath that spent a lot of
money. So maybe we could even go backwards from Fed fund rate,
going, you know, what looks like parabolic when you look at the
chart. Maybe you could speak to what got us to the Fed making
those decisions Chamath or Friedberg,
maybe I can just do a little cleanup on what SAC said. I
think your issues at Credit Suisse are different than the
issues at First Republic. And the issues at First Republic are
different than those other three banks. The other three banks,
David, that you mentioned, Signature, Silicon Valley Bank,
and Silvergate, all had very traditional liquidity crises,
right? We talked about this last week, which is duration
mismatching, where you have depositors who want their money
today, but you have assets that mature in 10 years. And as a
result, you have huge unrealized losses if you all of a sudden
cash them out today versus waiting 10 years. I think what’s
happening at First Republic is really just about making sure
that that loan book and the depositors can get parked into a
combination set of banks that can take care of the balance
sheet so that there are no more liquidity issues. At Credit
Suisse, they have an enormous amount of liquidity. What that
was, was I think a lot of speculation around whether they
would default on their bonds or whether they would theoretically
need more liquidity. But the balance sheet itself was not
only liquid, but also very solvent. So I think that was
just more of a panicky reaction to comments from a 9.9%
shareholder who just said that they can’t put in any more
equity. But even then, I went back, this is the chairman of
the Saudi National Bank. He was asked on Bloomberg, would you
give Credit Suisse more money? And he had a very reasonable
answer. But it was snapshotted in a very awkward way. The first
sentence was under no circumstances, would he do that?
Okay. Now, if you stop there, you could be panicked. But the
rest of it made a lot of sense, which is he said, Look, in Saudi
Arabia, if we go above 10%, we have to go through regulatory
approvals domestically, and there are regulatory approvals
abroad. That’s a big hill to climb. And all of a sudden, it
no longer becomes a financial investment, it becomes a
somewhat political investment. And so we’re very happy at 9.9%.
That was the totality of his statement. But if you just
cherry pick the first 45 seconds and ran with it, which people on
the internet did, this is sort of what caused that second level
wave panic at a GSIB. And then the Swiss National Bank stepped
in. And I think that that panic has largely gone. Okay, so what
is the real issue? The issue again, is I think we have had a
bit of supervisory failure here. Right? Because we all know this
in any industry. If you let capitalism go totally unchecked,
shareholders will demand immediate profits today. It
happens in every industry, except in ones where you can
basically gamble on future profits. And that’s what tech
does. But every other shareholder in every other asset
class demands money today. And that’s the same for banks. The
problem is the banks are a highly regulated business. They
are supposed to be supervised by the regulators. And this is a
very clear example where why is there not a real time
spreadsheet? I mean, this is not complicated stuff, where assets
and liabilities and duration mismatching can be known on a
real time basis where the San Francisco Fed, Mary Daly should
have a report that’s escalated to her when SVB got over their
ski tips, which they did in q4 of 2022. So I think the real
question that has to be examined is where were these folks for
the last four months when they could have done something, not
just about this, but rules in general for all banks that are
not the GSIBs. And I think that’s a very important question
that politicians need to get to the root of Friedberg, we
discussed this article from seeking alpha, which came out on
let me get the exact date here, December 19. Title of this
seeking alpha story is SVB financial colon blow up risk. And
the summary in three bullet points, says, bullet point one,
potential losses in loan portfolios could severely
impair book equity number two, unreal is unrealized losses in
hold to maturity portfolio already equal to book equity.
Number three, funding environment for startups were
pressure deposit base, adding even more pressure to the
balance sheet. In other words, startups spending money to cover
their burn rate, Friedberg. And obviously, we had the Dodd Frank
rules lessened or loosened under the previous administration. And
that specifically was driven by Silicon Valley Bank that had a
big part in that. So looking back on this, and people do want
to place blame, let’s talk about the effects that occurred,
because this was hiding in plain sight. Literally, in December in
an article that looks like it was written by somebody who went
into a time machine and said, How do I warn people in December
about this? Maybe you could talk about the Fed’s interest rates,
the spending and what led up to this look issue with the banks.
You guys remember when we started this podcast, three
years ago, we were like, they’re gonna shut down the economy.
There’s gonna be crazy second and third order effects of doing
that no one knows what they’re going to be. Here they are. And
I think that’s like the root of what is a rippling effect, you
can’t shut down the global economy, and stop trade and stop
people and have the government step in to write a giant check
and not expect that you’re going to have to cash that check at
some point. That’s effectively what I think we’ve been kicking
down the road here. The way we initially tried to resolve the
problem was to drop rates to zero, and then spend our way,
you know, back to a growing supported economy, and then
overshot ended up with, you know, too much stimulation, too
much stimulus, to lower rates for too long, responded too
quickly whiplash back. At the end of the day, there was a
giant gaping hole blown into the global economy. When we shut
down the world from COVID. There’s no blame, just what
happened. And when that happened, there was a massive
cost that had to be born at some point. And it’s going to get
born at some point and the rippling in a pond, you don’t
know where the ripple is going to hit what part of the pond
what leaves it’s going to hit. That’s what’s going on still.
And it’s such a dynamical system. It’s so hard to say with
linear certainty, this is what should be done and what could
have been done and what they should have done at the time. No
one had that predictive capacity back then. They did what they
needed to do. People thought that they should have dropped
rates. They said we should have written all these big stimulus
checks. Some people said you shouldn’t. Some people said you
did. Certainly. Some people are being proven right. And some
people are being proven wrong. But at the end of the day, the
economic loss that was realized at that period of time, we’re
still trying to get out of it. And we’re still recovering from
it. And I think that’s a big part of what’s being eaten up
right now. And you’re going to see it in the wipe out of
certain equity, you’re going to see it in the wipe out of these
banks of the assets that they hold and these portfolios. And
the effects of that are obviously, you know, still being
felt.
Sacks, do you agree that mistakes that this there isn’t
somebody to blame, because it is clear that the Fed said,
inflation is transitory, that was wrong. And then they went
faster than in history to raise the rates. Those seem like two
glaring mistakes. And then the Todd the Dodd Frank loosening
under Trump and with Silicon Valley Bank pushing them. That
seemed like a really big mistake.
By the way, I wasn’t saying the feds not to blame for not
raising rates faster. That was because you guys remember, I was
the first person to talk about what Stan Druckenmiller had said
that they’re not raising rates fast enough that we’ve got
massive inflation, we should have been raising rates. I was
the first person on the show to be, you know, barking that. So
don’t don’t forget, like, I was there, like, pretty early, what
I was pointing out was like, we shut down the economy during
COVID. The global economy. Yeah, I got you. So that is the
main cause that is the cannonball that got blown
through the ship. Got it. And everything else is plumbing and
patching and work to try and keep the ship afloat. And we’re
still dealing with that. And at the same time, as you guys know,
we’ve been loading the ship up with debt, the global ship, the
global economy with debt, 360% global debt to global GDP ratio
right now. And as that ship has gotten heavier and heavier to
have a giant hole blown in the side while you’re trying to do
all this patchwork with all this debt weighing on it. It’s a
critical challenge. And the ship is sinking feeling acutely
here. They’re feeling it in Europe now. And we’re certainly
going to see the global ramifications as we try and fix
this economic catastrophe that was caused by COVID at the same
time that we’ve been spending our way into a happier future
that it turns out we have to pay the bills for at some point.
sacks your response.
The question of who you blame for this banking crisis has
really become a political Rorschach test. And I’ve seen
that there are six different parties that people want to
blame in this situation. And there’s some merit to all of
them. But the degrees are very different. So number one, let’s
go to the bank. Okay, number one, the bank management of all
these different banks, clearly, very poor risk management
didn’t do a good job. They are to blame. However, and
Chamath is right about these banks, they differ in the
details. But the point is that they’re all operating under
conditions of extreme stress. Where did that come from? Number
two, the feds rapid rate tightening cycle, clearly, I
think that the combination of poor risk management, with a
spike in interest rates that basically has precipitated this
larger problem. Number three, is I think the Biden
administration spending which in fairness started with COVID
before Biden, but Biden really intensified it. And then I
think it really compound the problem in the summer of 2021.
By claiming that inflation was transitory when it wasn’t, that
allowed them to keep spending and keep printing money and kept
QE going for another six months that created the bubble of
- Everything got super frothy. And then that made the
rate cycle even more vicious, because you started six months
later, they could have started six months earlier, and it
could have been more gradual. And I think that really was a
disaster for the economy. Okay, number four, the D reg in 2018.
I think Elizabeth Warren, and Ro Khanna have made what I would
call a compelling case, that the D reg in 2018 have
contributed to this problem. I think, in hindsight, creating a
two tier system of banks, where one tier are the systemically
important banks who are completely guaranteed and
backstopped by the federal government. And then a sort of
lower tier, a second tier of regional banks was a poison
chalice for the regional banking system. Because in the short
term, it meant they were more lightly regulated, which may be
appropriate for, you know, smaller banks that aren’t these
mega banks. However, it has also now, I think, created a
situation where people are less confident about them. And so the
money flows are going from the regional banks to the
systemically important banks, the SIBs. So like I said, it
might be a double edged sword. And I think we’re gonna have to
look at those regulations and figure out what’s the right
regulatory regime to create confidence in the regional
banking system. We want a thriving regional banking
system. And so the question is, what’s the right regulations
that get us there? And then the final two that we can talk about
later are I’m hearing wokeness getting blamed, which, listen, I
think that wokeness was a distraction. There were a lot of
crazy programs happening at these banks. But listen, if
wokeness was the key factor, the whole Fortune 500 would be out
of business. Because they all do this stuff. They all do this
stuff. So I think we’re going back to the well a little too
often on that critique. And I don’t want to burn that critique
out. Because I think that wokeness is bad. But it’s not the
key reason why this stuff happened. And then the last
group that gets
wokeness, we could also maybe frame it as ESG more broadly as
the distraction because wokeness is charged ESG is real.
Yeah, what I would say for sure is that if these banks have
spent as much time on risk management as they did on ESG
or on woke, then this crisis wouldn’t happen. So definitely
a distraction, but not not the thing that like specifically
caused it. And then just the final thing is VCs. And I just
can’t fathom at this point, given the multiple bank
failures, given that we see the larger problem of unrealized
losses on bank balance sheets, that somehow any class of
depositors would be blamed for this, that just makes no sense
to me.
Chamath, I think the VC, the critique is specific to Silicon
Valley Bank, because I think and this article was in the Wall
Street Journal. But what it shows is a really complicated
intertwined relationship between VCs and Silicon Valley Bank
where, you know, VCs were given very cheap interest rate loans,
they were given GP call lines of credit, they were given LP lines
of credit. And then those same VCs would be directing their
companies to put their deposits inside of SVB, who would then
take those deposits and buy perhaps and buy risk. And while
the reality is all of this stuff will come to light because I
think it will get exposed as we go through congressional
hearings on all of this. But I think the I think pointing the
finger at VCs in this specific case, is somewhat warranted
because there was a little bit of people working in lockstep
together, and there was a lack of functional responsibility
around how to be a true fiduciary. So if you come to a
board, and your founder is 22 years old, and you give that
person 15 or $20 million, I think it makes a fair amount of
sense that you are supposed to be the more sophisticated
financial person in that room. And if you have incentives that
aren’t properly disclosed to that CEO, and now a set of
decisions are made, I think that that there should be some
accountability for that, or at least some exploration of why
that happened.
I just want to make sure the audience understands this
because it’s a bit in the weeds. And it’s a bit inside
baseball. What you’re saying Chamath is, if I can summarize
it, there are people who are the adults in the room, venture
capitalists, they have deposits at Silicon Valley Bank, they
also might have loans that are fantastic. With Silicon Valley
Bank, I have a mortgage for this office from Silicon Valley Bank.
And I talked about how on the last episode, how great it is,
they come, they open wine with you, it’s white glove service
that you wouldn’t get at another bank. And then they might have
loans against what’s called the GP carry or the GP share, or
they might have mortgages. And so there’s a conflict there. If
you’re a venture capitalist, and you’re directing a 22 year old
CEO to Silicon Valley Bank, maybe you’re doing that is
a conflict of interest. And in some cases, Silicon Valley Bank
is a limited partner in all of these funds. My point is that
all of these things of interest. Okay, hold on, we have to
explain that. So imagine a situation, you go and start a
fund, Silicon Valley Bank, and says, let me be a limited
partner and invest with you. Let me give you some amount of
money. I don’t know where that money comes from from Silicon
Valley. Well, let’s be realistic, more like 2550
million, 100 million. Okay, that’s a lot of money. So a
million kind of is whitewashing this problem. So you give them a
reasonable amount of money. They’re like, wow, I’m I have
tremendous loyalty for you. Thank you. Well, do you need
anything else? Do you need personal loans? Do you need
lines of credit for your business? Sure, why not? I take
those two. And invariably, on the back end, now your loyalty
obviously builds up again, nothing, none of this is wrong.
But this is what’s happening. And then you tell your
companies to keep your deposits there, maybe the cash management
program is not as strong as it would have been if you were more
circumspect, and you didn’t have those incentives to direct
people to one institution only in any other part of the market.
So in the public markets, as an example, there is such a bar for
disclosure. Okay, and I cannot stress this to you enough
related party transactions, all of this stuff. We have to tell
everything not just for us. But even if our like sister or
brother or mother may have a transaction with an entity that
we’re doing a deal with. And it just isn’t the case in private
markets. And so it’s not to say that anything untoward happened.
But when people point the finger at VCs, I think they are
pointing to this whole set of issues and asking the question,
shouldn’t there have been more disclosure and transparency
around it? And now that this has come to pass, shouldn’t we
explore it? And I think that’s what the Wall Street Journal
did, they started pulling on this sweater thread. And my
guess is that you’re going to find a whole ball of yarn at the
end of it. Saks, what do you think of this?
I think Chamath makes a fair point that if VCs have SVB as an
investor, and then they’re directing startups to use SVB,
that is a conflict that should be disclosed. By the way, we
never did either one of those things. We never had SVB as a
limited partner. And we also never direct our startups to
bank at SVB. I don’t know why we’d ever do that. Moreover, I
always try to talk founders out of taking venture debt, whether
from SVB or elsewhere. So listen,
we’d be clear about that. And to be clear, I never directed
anybody to a specific bank. I know, I told people to get two
or three banks and have redundancy.
Totally. Yeah, totally. And look, founders have multiple
VCs typically on their board. So the idea that like any one VC
directs them, which bank to use, it’s just not, that’s not
realistically what happens at these startups. But look, I
think Chamath is right that when there is a bank failure or any
kind of failure this big, then all the practices are going to
be under a microscope, and there’s going to be some
scrutiny. And maybe there should be. But my larger point is,
we’re now operating in an environment in which clearly
there’s a larger set of stresses on the banking system. We’ve
already had now five bank failures or near failures.
Moreover, do any of us believe that this is over? Or do we
believe there are more shoes to drop? If we believe that there
are more shoes to drop, we may not know exactly what they are.
But I think all of us probably believe that we’re not the end
of this. But But just to finish the thought, if we believe there
will be more shoes to drop, then clearly, the issues cannot just
be limited to Silicon Valley, they have to be a larger set of
issues.
There, I think that it’s important to understand the
facility that the Fed created. So what the Fed did this
weekend, is essentially create a buyer of last resort again. Now
how do they do this? So all of these banks basically have
assets that they bought for $1 and are now worth 95 cents. And
that’s what’s creating this whole issue or 80 cents or 85
cents, you pick the number, but they’re not worth the dollar
that they bought. What the Fed basically said is, okay, give me
that asset, give me that bond, I will value it at $1. And I will
give you $1 as a loan. And you will pay me interest. And the
interest rate, I think is what’s called OIS. And they added 10
basis points on top. So I think it’s about 4.9%. So what it
allows all of these banks, and if you take all of the banks
that are not the top four in America, so the top four are JP
Morgan, B of a city and well, so just ignore those for one
second, the other end banks, if you look at all of the assets
that are underwater, because of all the rate hikes that Saks
talked about, and you add up all those losses, that is about $2
trillion. And the Fed didn’t announce that there was a
beginning and an end to this program, other than saying these
would be one year loans. And so I think the exposure for the
American banking system at a minimum is going to be this $2
trillion. Because now the incentive, if you’re a banker
right now running one of these banks that has not gone under,
is to immediately go to the Fed, put all of those assets to them,
get a loan, and now take that and buy different assets,
different bonds, different US treasuries that are yielding
much more than what your old treasuries were yielding. And I
think that’s the arbitrage that we’ve unfortunately created. And
the other question now, though, however, is, what does that mean
for the top four banks? Right? Because if it’s 2 trillion for
everybody else, but the top four, what’s the gap for the top
four, that looks like it’s somewhere between a trillion and
2 trillion. So that’s another amount of money we’re going to
have to cover the federal have to backstop. And then, as
Friedberg said, these checks always come to what do we do in
a year? Because in a year, the problem is, the only way to make
the banks in a position to repay this much money in one year is
to cut interest rates so massively, that these assets
massively inflate. And now all of a sudden, you’re in a
position to cover this. So it’s a very bad delta is because it’s
about they’re down 15% 10% in book value these longer term
security. Again, it depends on what they bought. We don’t
really know enough detail. So I don’t want to guess. But if you
own these 10 year treasuries, you could be off 10 or 15%. If
you own mortgage backed securities, it could be off a
little bit more if you own short term securities, they’re off a
little bit less, but these are with the government, you get a
loan collateralized by these assets. So you still holding
them, right? Yes. And they mature. So if the Fed takes an
emergency posture and says, Okay, guys, we want to avert a
crisis in a year from now. And we’re going to cut rates, these
assets that these banks own will be worth more, which will allow
them to repay the loan. As far as I can tell, all we’ve done is
we’ve kicked the can down the road for a year. But I do think
it’s important for people to realize this doesn’t solve the
problem. It just means that mark your calendar for a year from
now, we have a problem on March 15 2024. Because all those folks
that took money, what do we do?
Yeah. And so a year to work it out, freeberg would seem like a
good idea, because the Fed is fighting inflation, they seem to
have gotten some portion of it under control. It’s not out of
control, right inflation. And maybe if they can slowly, you
know, either start rate cuts or pause. So let’s shift the
discussion to, hey, what are the changes we need to make to
the system? And how do we think this plays out over the next
year, freeberg? Chamath had one suggestion, which was all of
these banks should have a disclosure statement, mark to
market every day, week, month, quarter, whatever it is, just
like circles, USDC, their stable coin has a page with their
disclosures of all their holdings. So that seems to be a
very productive one, we should have them mark to market the
Dodd-Frank stuff, as SAC said, you know, Elizabeth Warren,
probably correct, we need to reverse that. So those are two
very tangible suggestions. What are your real time dashboard, we
need to have a real time dashboard at every single Fed
that allows them for every bank that they supervise to know in
real time, they should ignore it. I’m not sure that should be
true. But they are their supervisors, they should see it,
they should choose to ignore it, but they should not not have it.
freeberg, what are your suggestions going forward as to
how we can learn from this situation? Forget about the
cannonball, as you vividly expressed there, I think very
well, great analogy. But just going forward, how do we keep
the ship from taking on water, if we do have a cannibal hit it
again?
Now we got a hard, that’s a hard equation to solve. We got a lot
of that’s why I’m asking you. That’s why a lot of demands for
money. You guys see, I think there’s a lot of things that are
seem unrelated that are all pretty related right now.
There’s a massive protest underway by labor in France.
There’s a massive protest underway in the Netherlands.
There’s strikes on the underground in London, when we
talk about global debt, and us debt, we often, I don’t think
account for all the debt, which also includes promissory
obligations made to a workforce, global workforce that’s been
working for decades, individuals that have spent their whole
lives committed to some company or to some government working
with the expectation that they’re going to retire and have
some benefits paid to them. And there’s this massive under
funding of those benefits and those pools of capital, we very
quickly talk about unfunded pension liabilities. But when
you actually kind of account for the number of people and the
amount of capital that those people are expecting that the
workforce, the global workforce is expecting to be paid to them
in retirement, both public and private. It’s a massive amount
of money that’s not funded today. And you start to see the
cracks in the system, when that population says, my pension
payments are not keeping up with interest with inflation, or when
there’s a threat that pension payments or retirement benefits
are going to kick in at a later age, or you’re not going to get
them fast enough, you’re not going to get as many as you
thought you were going to get. We have that problem the United
States in the form of Social Security and these underfunded
pension liabilities. That is the critical macro tension in this
equation that I think drives the real problem that’s going to
come to a head at some point, we blew a hole in the in the in the
boat. But we’re also forgetting that there’s like a massive
amount of weight that’s going to drop on the boat. And I think
that it’s a really hard equation to solve, we can talk about
keeping bank solvent and all this sort of stuff. At the end
of the day, the central bank, it appears in the United States,
and probably globally, it’s going to be one big bank, right,
they’re basically going to take on the whole balance sheet
themselves. And, and at the same time, you’ve got a lot of folks
saying, I want to get paid more. I have obligations due to me. And
guess what, you know, Jason, your important statements
historically about the importance of democracies.
Ultimately, you know, the members of that democracy are
going to say, this, this is a benefit that the majority are
owed. And that’s going to pull things out. I think the only
stopgap, I’ll just say one thing, the only stopgap in the
next decade is going to be significantly higher tax rates
in the United States. I don’t see how you’re going to fulfill
the tension gap that’s underway right now, with respect to where
productivity is going and where capital markets are going, and
where the demands are on the system from people requiring
additional capital to come out to them without taxing assets
away from the asset holders. So this would be corporations and
high net worth people. And I think that’s why you see this
Biden proposal. We may not like it. But at the end of the day,
it’s going to be the only way to create a stopgap that’s that’s
that’s going to avoid massive inflation in the near term.
Reducing the proposal. Hold on, hold on one second. Let me just
say the only other way the only other I’ll just say one more
thing, Jake, I mean, the only other way, besides, you know, a
massive long term tax regime to fill the hole would be some
extraordinary productivity gain. And this is where we can all
have a hope and a dream and an investment and an effort around
technology, AI automation, people think that their energy
job energy, but if you can get energy down below three cents a
kilowatt hour, and you can scale its production by 10 fold,
if you can automate a lot of labor, if you can get AI to do a
lot of stuff that we do today, productivity will go through the
roof, the economy will grow fast enough to get out of the debt
bubble and meet all of these liability obligations. So there
are three ways. Yeah. So I think I think, to me, to me, that’s
the long term, the medium term is going to be this tax stopgap
is very high tax stopgap. And then the short term is going to
be all the shenanigans that we’re talking about. Okay, I’ll
go to you in a second sack. So just to recap, there is actually
a third way to there are three ways, productivity, as you very
astutely point out, and we just highlighted some of the ways
productivity could help whether it’s energy, AI, etc. The second
is, of course, increasing taxation on the people who are
at the top of the pile would be the likely solution. The third
is also austerity, cutting spending in some way. But let me
also propose one thing here, as we look forward to what do
people want out of a bank? And how should startups or just
individuals deal with bank runs and their trust in banks to
Chamath’s point? I was thinking about this over the weekend. And
then this discussion that we would have based on a lot of
things you said, sacks, which was people just deposited their
money, and they don’t have the ability to assess if a bank is
solvent, because the FDIC can’t do it. And it’s their full time
job. It’s their mandate to make sure these banks are solvent. So
how is a consumer going to be able to do that? Or even a
startup founder, or even a sophisticated investor, like
Ackman, or any of us, if we’re in fact, sophisticated. So let
me pause for a second here and posit something. We don’t want a
bank, we want a bank vault. Consumers do not want their
deposits to be used for shenanigans. Just like many
people would rather pay for a social network than have their
privacy data sold. So I think we should bifurcate banks into
bank vaults, and banks, banks can do what they want with your
deposits, you get free checking. But what I want in a
bank, what I want my startups to use what I want my venture firm
to use is I want to pay the bank for services, whether it’s 10
basis points, 25 basis points $500 a month, I would rather see
my startups pay $1,000 a month in banking fees $2,000 a month
on banking fees for $2 million, whatever it is, and pay for each
check pay for wires pay for white glove service, whatever
they choose, but not allow the banks to take that money and
loan it out or do things with it. I just want a vault. And I
think a vault service is what the majority of consumers want.
And given what we’re seeing with two insane bank run bailouts in
our lifetimes as adults, for those of us who are in Gen X 2008
and now, we would rather pay for services and I leave it to you
sex. Is this a potential solution? Because I don’t hear
anybody saying, give me a bank vault. And why does that service
not exist in the world?
Yeah, look, what people really want are they want a service
provider who gives them the ability to make payments, which
if you’re a small business is payroll and payables, things
like that. They want a money market fund to basically earn
interest. And, and they want all that to be safe. I mean, it’s,
it’s very simple. The idea that when you go open a checking
account at a bank, that you are making an unsecured loan to that
bank, that is not something that any consumer of small business
understands. That whole model, I think, is completely obsolete
and outdated. And what I heard so many people say, and I think
this is not sincere, I think it’s just because they hate
tech, is that depositors should take it on the chin. Because
somehow they made a stupid decision when they opened a
checking account. It’s like, are you kidding me? Listen, what do
you want the process to be? You want consumers and small
businesses when they open a bank account to have to review the
financial statements of that bank, try to figure out all their
disclosures, where their assets are, whether they have toxic
assets on the books. And if they don’t do a good enough job doing
that, if they’re not smart enough to do that, then you want
them to be disciplined. This is the word that I kept heard being
used as we need to discipline the depositors. The depositors
are not in a position to evaluate the balance sheet of
these banks. That’s what the feds are supposed to do. That’s
what the regulators are supposed to do. That’s what Moody’s is
supposed to do. And you’re telling me that a bank that had
an A rating from Moody’s the week before, and had an FDIC
seal of approval, that somehow they got it wrong. And the feds
got it wrong. But the
in related news was to get it right. I mean, come on, that’s
ridiculous. In related news to mouth, I would like an airbag
in my cars to protect my family. But I don’t want to evaluate the
airbag technology and unpack it and make sure that it’s got the
right
right. Well, yeah, let me finish the point. It’s about consumer
protection here. And I don’t care who the depositor is, if
the banking system is going down, because the feds haven’t
done their job. I mean, pal, two days before the bank failures
was testifying that he didn’t see stress in the banking
system. So either he was lying or asleep at the wheel, but we
are like I said, the feds had given the seal of approval to
SVB and all these other banks, they had all passed the
regulatory exams. And so to now put it on the depositor, when
the Fed screws up, and the regulators screw up, and
Washington screws up by printing all this money and creating this
inflation that we’ve had, again, out of all the six parties that
you could blame, I just think it’s the least culpable
Chamath should there be a service that provides no
interest, but is just a custodian of money that is
absolutely protected? Where is the bank vault product in the
world? Does it exist? Because I can’t seem to find it. Some
people seem to say I think Freeberg, you alluded to this,
maybe in the group chat, that if you have a brokerage account,
that’s kind of similar to what I’m saying, but it doesn’t have
it. I don’t want any interest. I don’t need any interest for
putting this money in the bank for a startup. They’re not in
the business of making one to 5%. And optimizing for that I
have founders who are now sending me five page memos, they
can’t if we think if Yeah, if the bank can’t use your money,
they’re gonna charge you. So remember, I want to be charged.
That’s the service I know. But I think this is an important
point, a bank is a service provider, they spend a lot of
money building technology, having people that work, they’re
providing service and infrastructure. So for the
services that they’re offering, if you’re not going to let them
use your money to make investments with your money, and
they can participate on that game, they have to charge you,
they charge you. And I think that’s really worth that.
Freeberg, Freeberg, not a service provider under the
current laws, you understand how it works now is that what we’re
being told is that when you went to the bank thinking you were
just getting a service provider, and frankly, largely a commodity
source provider, you’re getting a manager. Yes. And you’re being
told that you actually made a risky investment decision. Think
about that. When you open a checking account, you weren’t
just trying to, you know, again, use a vendor, you were actually
making a risky investment decision. That’s what they’re
trying to say. And you deserve to lose your money if you chose
poorly, even though nobody else could figure it out. None of the
experts could figure it out.
You should talk about the the challenges of your system to
someone who lives in Argentina. It’s far worse in other parts of
the world. And we’ve come a long way in the last 100 years, we
talked about 500 or 600 bank failures on average per year in
the 1920s. So I’m not saying that, hey, that’s not the case.
But there’s always been to some degree risk when people are
giving their capital over to someone else. And we’ve
certainly made huge strides in progress. But I think Jake out
to your point, you know, there is a point of privilege. Now
that people are saying I want to have a position where I know
that my money is not going to get used, not going to get
moved, going to be completely safe.
In a democracy for that, what’s the price Freeberg? What would
you pay for that? Because right now we’re basically giving every
crypto entrepreneur at zealot, you know, basically the high
ground because they could make this product, I would pay 10
basis points, literally $10,000 a year per million. Is that
right? Yeah.
Remember when you thought Jeff Bezos was going to be
president?
I still think it’s a distinct possibility. Anyway, what would
you pay for this product? Chamath or like Bloomberg or
Bezos?
I don’t want to speculate on new products. It’s kind of a dumb
tangent. I think the thing that you’re bringing up though is
dumb tangent. Okay. Why doesn’t a product like this exist? And I
think that it was very well explained. It’s that every
for profit business is in the business of making money. And
there are physical costs that you have to bear. In the case of
a bank, there is physical infrastructure, literally bricks
and mortar that go into making the branches, there are lots of
people, there is lots of software, there’s lots of
complex back office and middle office things that banks have to
do in order to accept money that has a cost. So I don’t see how
it will be very easy for somebody to create a bank that
just stores your money for you, without you being charged quite
a lot of money. Unfortunately, I think that there has to be a
different way to solve this problem. And I think that what
we did after the great financial crisis was the regulators wrote
down all kinds of new rules. But the crazy thing in 2008,
where those rules were written on paper, and now we’re in 2023.
And these rules can be written in software. And so I think what
it requires is some amount of tactical real time intelligence
that regulators need to have over those that they regulate.
And I don’t know why we’re so afraid of demanding that the next
time some of these complicated real time laws are written in
law that they also need to get written in code. And I think
that that’s a practical solution. It should be the case
that every bank that’s supervised by the Fed has a
dashboard that has all of the key levers that allows what you
said Jason to happen, which is a real time mark to market. Should
those or should those be discovered? Or should they not
be disclosed to shareholders? That’s a different discussion.
But the regulators should have 100% transparency into how these
organizations run, because as SAC said, they are an enormously
critical institution that at best case after this fiasco,
what we’ve realized is very poorly misunderstood by
consumers. And that at the worst case is being mismarketed to us.
Yeah, and I think that shouldn’t be allowed.
We’re also missing the other side of the balance sheet. We
haven’t talked about it at all. But banks play a really critical
and important role as lenders. banks act as the channel for
lending capital to small businesses for lending capital
to individuals to buy homes. It’s the primary place where
capital is provided to help fuel economic growth and prosperity,
particularly in the United States where we have such a
liquid fluid and available mortgage market to support home
buying in America. And the absence of, you know, Jason,
what you’re talking about, having the ability to use
deposits to make loans, and have what banks have
fundamentally been in this country for over 100 years,
which is taking short term deposits to make long term loans
and making sure that there’s some degree of balance and
availability of liquidity to support transactions. And
ultimately, mortgage securities came out of the need to generate
more liquidity by banks to support depositors. And
obviously, there was all these inflationary things that
happened in that market and bubbles that happened. But it’s
an important role that banks play. And the lending aspect of
banks if it gets stifled too much, because we swing too far
the other way, it can actually have a really adverse effect on
economic growth and prosperity, and the ability for people to
to afford homes in this country. So that’s the other side of the
coin and where things can go bad.
So this is where I find like the the current banking model to be
sort of like weird and maybe obsolete, and definitely not
what consumers expect. So for example, if you go to a bank,
and you put your money in a deposit account, and then they
loan it out to make mortgages, do you realize that you’re an
investor in those mortgages as the as the depositor? I don’t
think you do.
I mean, what what they what they do is they take those mortgages
sacks, they package them up, they sell them, and they get an
origination fee and they get the money back.
Not always.
Maybe they should be maybe they should have to
be a Wells Fargo do not exactly. So B of A Wells Fargo, for
example, they do a lot of that. But if you look at First
Republic, they have a $90 billion loan portfolio on their
balance sheet that they’ve not packaged up and sold. So the
packaging and selling of mortgages generated the
liquidity that the banks needed. But there’s a cost to
that. So a lot of banks will try and balance out their loan
portfolio where they’ll package some of it up and sell it. But
when they do that, they take a loss, they pay
maybe they should be required to do that. Because because, because
I mean, look, to the point about mark to market assets, it’s very
hard to mark an asset to market unless it’s liquid and publicly
traded.
Let me give you an economic point. I think that there’s
about $7 trillion in deposits in banks. So if what you guys are
saying happened, you’re basically sucking $7 trillion
out of the system that’s being used to fuel purchasing in the
form of loans. And you’re taking that set or call it a 10%
discount to that. So about call it $6 trillion. And you’re
saying, we got to go find a market for $6 trillion of loans.
And then we’re going to have $6 trillion of cash sitting in a
bank account doing nothing. And that that challenges
that cash, we’re going to money market funds. So in other words,
like you’d package up all those mortgage bonds, you create a
mortgage bond security. And then if consumers if depositors want
that product, they’ll just buy it.
Yeah, but what is a money market? It’s it ends up being
the same thing where money is you earn interest on cash that’s
being used to make investments elsewhere. So ultimately, if you
want to earn interest on your cash, it has to be loaned out
somewhere to someone.
I understand. But what I’m saying is, look, I’m just
brainstorming here. I don’t you know, I don’t have the spit
balling. Yes, exactly. I’m not saying this is what should be
done. I’m just kind of asking whether it might make more
sense. What if on the depositor side, all of the things you put
your money in our money market funds, and then when the bank
goes out and does his lending business, it does ultimately at
some point have to package those up, and they get turned into
securities.
You know, sexy, but money market funds. You know where that cash
goes. So when you when you invest in a money market fund,
you’re you’re giving money to someone who’s using it to make a
loan. Like it is also
I understand. But then the depositor would never be marked
to market is sexist point deposit would never be a risk. We never
be a risk of bank failure.
I just want to give you’re shifting the risk equation to
the fund manager, the money market instead of the manager of
the bank. And at the end of the day, that money is just the
owner of that security, that money market fund, that would
take the hit.
Okay, just as we wrap here, because I’m going to talk on
some other issues as well. There’s two things that are
super tangible that founders can do right now are people who want
to mitigate against these kind of issues. There’s something
called ICS insured cash sweeps. These are accounts that
automatically, you know, will put your money into multiple
FDI insured institutions, 250 k at a time, we talked about this
previously. There’s a bunch of folks doing that in fintech. I
won’t give any of them free plugs here. But you can just go
look in search for ICS. There is also maybe some thought here
that the FDIC 250 k limit, maybe that’s outdated, certainly for
businesses it is. So maybe that should double or triple. And
obviously that cost would be spread out. And then finally,
you can go to treasury direct.gov right now and buy
short term government debt. And I literally have startups doing
this who have major treasuries. They’re going there and buying
short duration stuff themselves, holding it themselves. So they
don’t have to worry. This is part of this provided by the
government is my understanding and people are buying direct
from the government.
I personally am not a fan of startups buying T bills because
of the duration mismatch problem. They always
underestimate when they’re going to need their cash. And so
I don’t like tying up cash.
If you had a giant treasury.
Yeah, but this is always wrong. I see this all the time whenever
they try to say when start trying to create laddered bond
portfolios, they end up needing the money sooner than they
thought. What I’d much rather see startup do is buy 100% US T
bill backed money market fund run by the absolute biggest of
the big financial institutions, because you can get in and out
of it at any time you want, and without paying a fee. And that’s
so much better than trying to manage your own bond portfolio.
Let a professional fund manager do it.
Well, there are people who do provide these kind of bond
ladders. I’m just telling you what the best practice advice
going around your symbol through like a brokerage account, sure,
or multiple ones, right. And but now this is I think, speaks to
Chamath. The fact that we have startup founders and people
having to measure manage a treasury. This granularly, is
this a failure? Or is this what should be happening? Should we
have to have treasuries in the 10 million or $20 million range be
this granularly managed? Or should this just be FDIC rates,
you know, should be just a 10x?
Well, in the absence of regular regulatory changes that protect
this money, you need to have a financially sophisticated actor
on the board. And again, I go back to that should be your
venture capitalist. And that person should not have conflicts
of interest with the banks that they direct you to. I mean, I
don’t think that that’s a very controversial statement.
Yeah, it’s just not happening. And I am just flabbergasted that
people are not even doing the basic blocking and tackling
here of having three or four accounts. I’ve always had three
or four banking relationships always had it split up. Should
we move on to some of the other pressing issues? There was a
really interesting founders fund story about them breaking their
latest fund in half. And then there is stripe closing their
funding, which one would you gentlemen like to go to or a
different story on the docket?
I think there are, there are four things that are very
interrelated, okay, in startup land. So founders fund took
there, just to make the math simple, because I’m going to get
the numbers not exactly right, but like a $2 billion fund that
they’re going to break into to $1 billion fund. So I think
that’s 1.8 billion dollar fund, they’re going to break it into
to $900 million funds, it’s their eighth fund, it’s being
cut in half, and it’ll become eight and nine.
I think what that speaks to is valuations, and the marks that
we think we have for existing companies and the future value
that smart investors like this see all roads lead to it says
we’re in for a slog. And so trying to put a $2 billion fund
to work doesn’t seem to make a lot of economic sense to some of
the smartest people in the room. So that’s, that’s that the
second window there, it says, according to Axios, Peter Thiel
led this charge, and he is the contrarians contrarian. He was
the one according to access that led that cut of the fund size
with summit founders fund, according to the reports,
opposing him,
I’ll say the more important thing, which in Peter and I are
in the same, we’re the largest LPS in our funds. And so, you
know, as the largest LPS in our funds, I think this is a
no brainer decision. Number two, stripe basically takes a
50% haircut, which is the single best run, most highly valued
company in Silicon Valley. Again, that’s going to eviscerate
private company, a lot of TV pi and a lot of people’s
portfolios, a lot of theoretical money that LPS we’re going to
get. I think the third thing is, there’s a person that went and
filed a FOIA request that UC Berkeley to get sequoias
returns. And it turns out that the best investor in the game,
quote unquote, since 2018, has not really done that well. And I
think in the University of California, invested over $800
million in Sequoia since 2018. And I think his return, what
some 40 million bucks on that number. And then the fourth
which just came out today is that Tiger wrote down the value
of their private book by 33% for 2022. And so, you know, I think
Tigers am basically has gone from 100 billion to 50 billion
in a year.
There’s one more note to add to that YC, basically let go of
their growth team this week, Y Combinator, for people didn’t
know what was called the continuity fund, they were doing
late stage investing, and that got cut, gosh, which is a signal
and the 17 employees are gone now. And Gary Tan, I think is
making the right decision. You know, they have to focus on what
they’re great at, which is the earliest stage of the company,
and they had conflicts with this one.
Look, this is the most interesting thing. For me in the
following way, I think the Y Combinator unicorn hit rate is
6%. Right. So every 100 companies that come out of YC,
which costs only about $10 million to seed, right, six of
them become worth a billion dollars or more. And obviously,
some become worth much, much more. And so if you see how
difficult it is, even for a growth fund that’s attached to
that funnel, to be successful and make money, because
obviously, if this thing was turning cash, you would not have
cut it. I don’t think anybody would do that. So I think it was
a very challenging strategy at a challenging moment in time. And
so I applaud these guys for having the discipline to do it.
But if you take them all in totality, it is a complicated
place in venture capital and startup land. Holy mackerel,
like, it’s a reset a it’s tough to make money be a lot of folks
may not know exactly what they’re doing. See, a bunch of
valuations are totally wrong. And D, we’re gonna have to start
doing the cleanup work now resetting all of it, which just
takes years as you guys remember, it took us, it took us
five years to fix this.
It’s a hard reset sacks. What do you when you look at these in
totality? What would you say?
Well, I agree with what Chamath just said. I mean, it’s gonna be
a hard period with a lot of resets, a lot of restructuring,
a lot of cap tables, there’s a lot of mess to clean up. All of
that being said, I think I’d rather be an investor today than
an investor two years ago, or one year ago. Because at least
the valuations have corrected to some degree. And then also, we
have this really interesting AI wave happening now. And there’s
a lot of opportunities to invest in that new, you know, cycle. So
at least there’s like an interesting product cycle. It’s
getting me excited to go to work and see these new demos from all
these different companies. Whereas, you know, you go back a
year or two, and just the product innovation doesn’t seem
as world changing as it does now. So I think that as bad as
things are, my guess is that the new vintages of VC are going to
be better than, you know, call it 2021. For sure.
That’s not going to be a high bar.
It’s not a high bar, but
that’s
the thing. But actually, Chamath, Chamath, this is a
contradiction.
Trash. Trash.
This is the contradiction is that it felt better to be a VC
in 2021. But in hindsight, we know that the vintage is going
to be not good. Whereas today, hold on, but today, it feels not
great to be a VC, but I think the vintages will be a lot
better.
But anybody would tell you that at some point, you’re going to
have to divorce yourself from emotion to be a reasonably good
investor over long periods of time. How many data points do we
need to realize that too many people were put into this game
that may not have known what they were doing. And we’re going
to have to go and work through all of those excesses. And I
think it’s just going to take a lot of time us limited partners
are in a really difficult spot. European investors, I think are
probably in a pretty difficult spot. There are a couple of
bright, bright points around the world of folks that are still
optimistic and doing well. I think Middle East is one Southeast
Asia is another. But other than those, it’s just a whole group
of folks that just have to get completely re underwritten from
first principles. Even when you have an incredible platform like
Sequoia, five years of no returns on $800 billion for
somebody like UC Berkeley, what it really means without
commenting on Sequoia performance is that UC Berkeley is
effectively out of business in being a limited partner for the
foreseeable future. Well, right. And I think that has that has
implication. So even if you think these vintages are great,
I don’t think they’re open for business. And and frankly, if
even if they wanted to be open for business, how do you go to
an IC, when they look at all of the totality of those dollars
that have not made anything? How do you justify the next 800
billion? I just think it’s very hard.
While I agree that LPS are out of it. I think the story was
garbage, because it all funds go through a J curve. And they’re
literally talking about the majority of the funds in that
vintage 2008 2019 2020 21. They’re all in literally the
definition of the J curve, the third, fourth, fifth year,
one of the most important things you need to be able to do is
measure how long does it take the delta t to 90% of calling
committed capital? And how long does it take the delta t to
return one x DPI? I can tell you, Jason, if you’re a
reasonably good fund, those numbers should be between five
and seven years for both,
which none of those funds have hit the average for a normal
venture fund is around five to seven years to call 90% of the
capital, and around five to seven years to return one x DPI.
I’m just telling you, that’s what the average is. And if you
talk to firms, so all I’m saying is there was a period of time,
where in the absence of getting money back, again, this is not a
Sequoia thing. Yeah, it just means that there was an entire
cohort, and years of capital allocation that is not
necessarily in a J curve, it’s impaired. Because if after five
years, you’ve after five years, you’ve returned nothing.
Sometimes you just have to see the writing on the wall,
sacks, explain the J curve one more time for folks. And then
what is your analysis of that Sequoia story?
Well, the J curve, the theory behind it is that when you start
deploying a new fund, you’re drawing fees down to pay for the
firm and the investments you’ve made have not been marked up
yet. So the value of the fund is actually going down, because
some of it’s getting eaten up in fees. And you haven’t really had
a chance for any of those investments to be successful.
And what happens happen early, right?
I don’t even know. I just think it’s they haven’t had a chance
to get marked up. But then what happens is you start getting
markups. And now at least on paper, the value of the fund
goes up. And then hopefully, those markups eventually turn
into distributions or DPI, like Jamath is talking about. Yeah,
we have a vintage 2017 2018 fund that’s actually fully returned
at this point,
you exited some secondaries or acquisitions?
No, we just had some we just had some exits. But look, I think
that is a little bit on the early slash lucky side. But we
haven’t really seen much of the J because, you know, you should
be getting markups within two years. I think on your
investments, if the companies are looking good, at least
historically, that was the case.
Freeberg, any any thoughts on this collection of stories with
venture, basically having the great venture reset? The end of
the super cycle, the beginning of the next?
It’s happening.
Okay, we’re in the thick of it.
But by the way, I would just I would go back to the point that
with all the problems Jamath is talking about the reset and the
wipeout that needs to occur. I think this is still that I think
that’s part of what makes this a better time. Absolutely. To be
an investor.
This is what I’ll say about that, sex. I think I agree with
you. I disconnect asset values and asset prices from
fundamental business value being created. So the market bid stuff
up prices went up. That doesn’t really mean that businesses
aren’t fundamentally good that there aren’t amazing technology
businesses being built today that are going to affect
billions of lives tomorrow. If you are tracking a public
company stock, and you like the business, you spend time with
management, you see what they’re building, you see their revenues
growing, their profits are growing, they’re making great
products, people are happy with what they’re doing. But the
stock’s really expensive. You don’t want to buy the stock.
Suddenly the stock drops by 80%. Nothing about the business has
changed. It’s just that the market is paying less to own
shares in that company. That’s a great time to buy that stock. I
think that’s the moment we’re in in Silicon Valley. Everyone’s
like, oh my god, it’s over. Things are terrible. Just
because the asset prices of the shares in companies has gone
down, does not mean that the quality of the businesses has
changed, or that there isn’t fundamental value being created
in Silicon Valley. In fact, the contrary point to sexist comment
is that it is a great time to be buying these shares. And it is a
great time to be investing. And it is a great time because as
we’ve talked about countless times, there are extraordinary
technologies, from AI, to biotech becoming software, to
fusion, to novel applications with AI and SAS, and on and on
and on many of the amazing things we’ve talked about that I
think can and will affect many industries and billions of lives
are being built today, and they’re not going to stop being
built. And you can now buy the stock at 80% off. So, you know,
if you’re investing today, and if you’re a builder today, as
long as the capital keeps flowing to support the building
work, which I think to some degree it will because there’s
still enough of it sitting there. You’re not going to have
a lot of these crazy growthy rounds with high prices and all
the nonsense that went on the last couple years. But there’s
certainly a lot of opportunity to create real business value.
And right now an opportunity to buy shares pretty cheap, and
participate meaningfully in that value creation.
I’ll tell you the thing I’m seeing on the field and like
playing the game on the field is something we’ve been talking
about for the last year. We started a program called founder
dot university and it’s basically a 12 week course on
like how to build your MVP. We had 350 people join the discount
people can use to this discount code. It’s free for founders,
basically, if they if it’s free for founders, if they come to
the 12 weeks. But anyway, what I did was, no, it’s founder dot
university because it’s an extension. But in the words of
sacks, let me finish. Please let me finish. What we did was we
just said anybody who gets to an MVP, and it’s two or three
builder co founders will give them a 25 k check. And I did 20
or 30 of these 25 k checks in the last couple of months of
just the founders right now who have been laid off by other
companies. They’re dogged, pragmatic, absolutely
customer centric product centric founders, whereas the last five
years have been filled with theatrics, and white papers and
ICOs and just nonsense and absurd valuations and people
wanting credit for work not done. And now people are
actually building MVPs. And they’re dogged, product driven
founders, customer centric, mission driven founders, and it
feels to me that like,
that first part is so well said people wanted all this credit
for work not done, and for progress not achieved. That game
is over.
Finished, finished, which means if you are a product led CEO,
and you’re a mission driven CEO who actually built something,
you stand out so much in this ecosystem, and have people
begging for money, sending me long emails and decks and total
addressable market, I’m just like, can you just build a
product and show me that you can actually deliver a product. And
then we’ll start the process of the rewards based system here,
you know, the the reward based system in Silicon Valley is so
magical when it works, you get money from Foundry University,
or, you know, Techstars or Y Combinator, then go to a seed
fund, then go to a Series A fund, that milestone based
funding was so broken. And now it’s back. And it’s so
functional when it’s working. It’s just a magic of Silicon
Valley is when people work and get rewards, work and get
rewards. And it just creates this great pace and dynamic that
I’m glad to see. Just as we wrap here, everybody’s been begging
for a science corner enough about the chaos in the world.
Everybody wants the sultan of science to tell us and educate
us about something. And Saks needs to use the loo anyway. So
let’s do a science corner here. Room temperature, super
conductors, you sent me a link, I read the abstract of this
paper. And I don’t know which language I need to put this into
Google Translate, but I couldn’t understand any of it. So I
literally read the abstract. And I was like, I couldn’t get
through the first two sentences without having to start doing
searches. I’ll start with just like the simple explainer on
superconductors. You know, materials that conduct
electricity are called conductors. So conductors
electrons move through them like a copper wire. That’s how
electricity flows. And all conductors have some amount of
resistance, meaning not all the electrons kind of flow through
at a perfect rate, they bump into the atoms in the material
in the wire, and they generate heat, you know, you’ve ever felt
a wire while electricity is flowing through it gets hot,
right. So that’s because the conductor has some resistance,
which means the electrons bump into the walls of the atoms in
the material, they generate heat and you lose electricity, you
lose energy, you lose power. And so in 1911, it was discovered
when mercury was reduced to a very, very cold temperature,
that there was a point at which the material conducted
electricity with absolutely no resistance. So the electrons
flowed through the material, completely unbounding on, you
know, not bouncing into the material not generating any
heat. And having no resistance mean you’re losing no power in
transmission of that electricity, but a number of
other super interesting effects occur. Number one is that
magnetic fields now reflect off of that metal perfectly. So if
you put a magnet, you ever seen that image of a nick, we could
probably pull one up in the YouTube video, we put a magnet
on top of a superconductor, it actually floats. Because the
magnetic field like the north and the north push against each
other, and it floats up. So superconducting materials kind
of became this fascination in the early 20th century, that oh
my god, if we can actually make materials that superconduct,
there are all these amazing benefits. One of the benefits is
you could have no loss in electricity being transmitted.
Today, 15% of power is lost in the transmission from the power
station to your home. You could also do interesting things like
create maglev or frictionless trains that float, you know,
like magnets floating off the ground on top of a
superconducting track. And by having no friction, you could
push the trap the train once, and you wouldn’t need to use any
energy to move it along. So you could have basically powerless
transportation, you could have really powerful, new
microprocessors. So a superconductor microprocessor
instead of a traditional semiconductor microprocessor
would use just 1% of the energy of a semiconductor
microprocessor. Think about that all the AI stuff we’re talking
about all the chips that we’re talking about dropping the
energy needs by 99%. If those chips were made from a
superconducting material, and one of the more interesting
applications of superconducting materials could be infinite
battery storage. So you could take a superconductor, turn it
into a coil, and the electricity would just flow through it
infinitely, because it would never turn into heat. And then
when you’re ready for that power, you just plug in and you
get the power out the actual loss of energy in a
superconductor battery, less than 5%. And that’s compared
with, you know, significantly more energy loss used in
chemical systems. And you wouldn’t need to kind of get all
the materials that we’re struggling to get now to
generate batteries. So the idea of generating like
superconductors and industrial scale has always been super
interesting. Today, the way that we generate superconducting
materials is we have to make a material super, super cold. In
1987, a physicist named Chu developed one of the first
ceramic superconductors where they discovered a new way of
generating superconductivity. It wasn’t just taking a metal and
cooling it down very, very cold, because when you get it very,
very cold, the atoms stop moving, and the electrons inside
pair up and it’s called Cooper pairing and they flow through.
And he said, we could actually do this with a hotter
temperature. And he demonstrated this in a ceramic
yttrium barium copper oxide, super confusing name. But
basically, he took a bunch of materials and baked them in an
oven. And they turn into this really interesting material that
became superconducting. And then the race was on. Because what he
did is he made a superconductor that could superconduct at the
temperature of liquid nitrogen. And liquid nitrogen is really
cheap. So we can just use and that’s actually how all MRI
machines run today is you have superconductors that reflect the
magnetic fields in the soup in the MRI machine, and they’re
using liquid nitrogen to stay cool. And so there’s a lot of
industrial applications today that use superconducting
materials using liquid nitrogen. But in order for us to do all
the stuff I mentioned, like maglev trains and infinite
battery storage, and superconducting microprocessors,
we have to get superconductors, we have to discover a material
that can superconduct at room temperature, so that we can sit
with it in a computer on our desktop, or we can have it run
on a railroad track. Or, you know, we can put it in our
backyard to store energy. And there’s been this race and
there’s all these different classes of materials that
physicists and material scientists have spent decades
trying to figure out what can superconduct at room
temperature, we started with metals, you know, copper, and we
tried carbon nanotubes and fullerene tubes. We had all
these different ceramics like like was like I talked about,
and there have been literally 10s of 1000s of ceramics that
people bake in ovens and try and see how superconducting they
are. Basically, you take the material, and you cool the
temperature and you measure the resistance. And as soon as it
hits superconductivity, boom, there’s this magic moment where
it drops to zero, and it becomes superconducting. And there’s
this big changeover effect. So everyone’s trying to find that
temperature which it can happen at room temperature. And people
have found superconductivity on the surface of DNA and organic
molecules. But you can’t scale that people have found, you
know, superconductivity and all these weird kind of material on
the surface of things, but no one’s ever been able to
industrialize it. In 2015, there was a new kind of material
called a hydride, which is basically taking a thin metal
and putting it in hydrogen gas and kind of baking it for a
couple of days, and the hydrogen sticks to the metal. And then
you would use this hydride as a new kind of conductor. And
hydrides, it turned out had really good superconducting
potential, they would superconduct at room
temperature, but they needed super high pressure. So you’d
actually have to leave them in like something that’s like
hundreds of times the pressure of the atmosphere. And so that
that’s not really technically and industrially feasible
either. So this guy named Ranga DS published a paper a couple
of weeks ago that got a ton of press, and a ton of controversy.
And basically, he said, Look, I’ve got this new hydride. And
it’s I’ve got this really, you know, weird metal that no one
ever talks about. And I’ve baked it with this with hydrogen gas.
And this hydride can actually superconduct at, you know, room
temperature, and at only one gigapascal, which is still
greater pressure than room temperature. But it basically
starts to show on the chart of are we getting there? Can we
actually get there that maybe we are. And so this paper was
published in nature a couple of weeks ago, and it got a ton of a
ton of coverage because everyone’s like, Oh my gosh, the
problem is this particular individual. You know, the lead
researcher Ranga DS on the on the paper, he’s pretty
controversial, because he made a room temperature
superconducting claim back in 2020, in a paper he published in
nature. And after he made that that claim, a lot of scientists
tried to replicate what he did, and they were not able to. And
then the journal retracted his paper. And he had a method that
he took data noise out of the measurement system he was using.
And the way that he took the data noise out, people said
actually skewed the results and made it look like it was
superconducting when maybe it wasn’t. And he actually had a
talk that he did that was published on YouTube, a year
later, where he said he raised $20 million from Sam Altman and
Daniel Eck and a bunch of other investors. And it turns out that
also wasn’t true. And then he came back and said, Well, I
didn’t actually raise the money. I was talking with them about
raising the money. So this guy’s kind of a sketchy character in
the space, but the temperature at which he was able to
generate or claims to have generated and he did get peer
review and did get published. A superconductor is at room
temperature, it’s at slightly high pressure. But if it’s real,
and it does get repeated, it’s one of the next steps that we’re
almost going to be getting to this point of true room
temperature superconducting materials. And then this whole
industry will blow up transmission lines, battery
storage, maglev trains, superconducting microprocessors.
You know, many new industries can and will emerge from this
material discovery if it’s proven to be real. So you know,
it’s a super interesting storyline, a lot of people in
the material science world and scientists, chemists,
physicists are kind of going crazy about this. And there was
a survey done by quantum magazine, and half the scientists
were like, this is bullshit. And the other half was like, this is
going to change the world. So we don’t really know yet where this
is all going to settle out. But I thought it was worth kind of
talking about and bringing it up. Because if room temperature
superconductivity is really realized in the next decade,
it’s another one of these kind of black swan technology
discoveries that we none of us are thinking about right now.
But it totally transforms all these markets. And very quickly
kind of increases like we were talking about earlier,
productivity makes renewable energy super, super cheap, makes
computing power 99% less power intensive, AI chips will explode
using this technology. So a lot of super interesting applications
if room temperature superconductivity comes to light.
Super interesting story. I thought we should share it and
talk about yeah,
Chamath, I would love to get your insights on it. And then
sacks, I would like to understand how many emails and
what you ordered from Uber eats during that segment. Go ahead,
Venkat Viswanathan, who runs a battery group at Carnegie Mellon
introduced me to Ranga two years ago, me and my partner, Jay, we
were like, holy shit, this is outrageous. And we tried to spin
it out into a natural company. But the University of Rochester
blocked it. And so we’ve been following this guy for two years
and all the trials and tribulations. But it’s a really,
really exciting thing. If it does come to you got capital
blocked, explain why you would get capital blocked in a
situation like that. Why wouldn’t they allow you to spin
it up? It is interesting, because like, typically
universities have a tech transfer office, and you can do
these deals pretty cleanly. So you know, when you go to Stanford,
the tech transfer office is quite sophisticated at MIT, it’s
quite sophisticated. There are these pretty standardized deals
and, and what is the standard deal? Explain to the audience
how a tech transfer deal would work? And how does the
university make money from it? If you’re a prof and you invent
something, or even if you’re a student, it’s technically owned
by the school. And so if you want to commercialize it, you go
to them and use basically say, here’s a capital partner of mine
and we want to go and start a company around it. And what they
will normally say is, okay, great, give us a piece of equity
and give us some royalty in some cases, depending on what it is,
especially the equity tends to be in the mid single digit
percentages, the royalties tend to be in the mid single digit
percentages, it depends on how Okay, yeah, call it 5567%. But
it can be a lot when you think about a, you know, a school like
Stanford who’s spinning out hundreds of these things a year.
But if you’re if you’re a school that doesn’t historically do a
lot of tech transfer, or has a lot of cutting edge R&D, you
wouldn’t have that team. And so Rochester didn’t necessarily
have it. Now look, Ranga is probably getting bombarded by 30
other people who will pay 10 times more than what I was
trying to pay 18 months ago. It’s a really interesting thing.
And I think there’ll be some there’ll be some what’s the
anybody know what the top tech transfers of all time were like
was Google a tech transfer free bird, you know, like, yeah,
because he drank was out of the what it’s down or take? No,
yeah, Larry and Larry and Sergey gave Stanford, I think one of
the Stanford Yeah, they gave him a percent. Yeah. Wow.
Because backrub was written while Larry was a PhD there. So
technically, they you know, they had some part of it. Carnegie
Mellon ranked as top tech transfer university. I’m just
seeing here in terms of the rankings, University of Florida,
Columbia, Stanford, Harvard,
it varies so much, some of them are terrible, like, and some of
them are cronyism. So like, you go to some of the universities
and the tech transfer offices have deep relationships with
certain VCs and investors that they’ll only work. And they
always get first picks and first dibs, and they’re super tight
with them. They don’t run a real market process. And then some
tech transfer offices just give away the farm for nothing. And
then some tech transfer offices think that they own it, and they
should get paid 60% royalties for the thing. It’s all over the
map. And some of them are sophisticated, and some of them
are not. So it’s, it’s actually quite surprising, J. Cal, how
different all the universities are in terms of their level of
sophistication and the types of deals they’ll do. But I will say
this work in superconducting research. It’s another good
example, going up to going back to the point a couple episodes
ago about the importance of fundamental research and the
importance of, you know, the support from academic
institutions and governments and other aspects when you’re still
not sure what the technology is, that to do that fundamental
discovery work, I think is a good collective social benefit.
And then to industrialize it and commercialize it requires, I
think, a market based approach, which is you take that
capability, try and build a business find customers make
money. And that’s really how you get it to be funded to be
scaled. Because you’re never gonna you shouldn’t have to put,
you know, government and academic money behind that sort
of effort. But private market participants should. And so,
you know, it’s interesting. I mean, I think I’m not holding my
breath. I’ve been, you know, I did a science project in 1993,
when I was probably 12 or 13 years old, on superconductors.
And I got a yttrium barium copper oxide disk. And I got some
liquid nitrogen from UCLA. And I poured it on the disk, and I
floated a magnet above it. And I had a poster board and a
computer presentation back then. And I was super enthralled about
the future of superconductors. And exactly what I said today is
what I said back in 1993. So you know, 30 years ago,
it was so busy dating, I didn’t think you had time for
superconductor experiments.
Yeah, look, I don’t think I don’t think that this stuff has
really, it’s been, it’s been like fusion, it’s always been a
promise around the corner. physicists have always had hope
we’ve taken incremental steps towards it. But it’s always felt
like one of those things, where you’re always getting 50% closer
to the wall. It’s like you’re never actually reaching the wall.
And so
anecdotally, one Yeah, by the way, I will say one area that
that that a lot of people think holds a lot of promise for
superconducting research is in quantum computing, because you
can actually model on a molecular level, what might be
going on. Right now, the BCS theory is this theory on Cooper
pairing that happens in ceramics is the only way that we really
understand how superconducting actually works, why it works,
why there’s no resistance at certain temperatures for certain
types of materials. For most materials, we have no friggin
clue why it happens. We don’t understand the physics of it.
There’s something going on on a quantum mechanical level that we
just don’t get. And so if we can understand it better through
quantum modeling, using quantum computers, all of a sudden, we
may be able to actually start to come up with ideas for molecules
and crystal structure that would allow us to make superconducting
material that we simply don’t have enough time in our lifetime
to run all the experiments in a lab today, and we can simulate
it. And so that’s why quantum computing could play a real role
in advancing our ability to do discovery and superconducting
materials. And like I talked about, these are like not just
one, but like two or three order of magnitude improvements in the
efficiency of certain systems of industry on earth today. So it
shows how the compounding benefits of technology and things
you cannot see around the corner can suddenly cause these
explosive growth moments in technology in an industry. I
don’t know what when quantum computing gets here, when it
gets here, it might discover superconducting. And then when
that gets discovered, boom, energy costs drop by 99%
computing goes up by 100 fold. So there’s these amazing things
that are still like in front of us that each one of which could
be, you know, really great exponential triggering events.
And we’re seeing a little milestone today. But yeah, I
don’t know.
Saks reaction.
Sounds good.
Saks, how many moves did you play in your 12?
Chess games?
We were was talking about superconducting. How many
points did you go up?
All right, look, I got shit. Let’s go.
Oh, sacks. All right, listen, this has been a great episode.
Comment on the Atlantic article that says Ron DeSantis has
peaked already. Oh, don’t do it. Don’t do it. Why you got to
troll him?
See that but it’s in the Atlantic. Oh, you want to know
why the Atlantic suddenly has turned on him is because they’re
the biggest backers of the war. They those guys have all these
like neocons over there. And so he gave a statement saying that
you know, our support for Ukraine shouldn’t be a blank
check and some other comments expressing, let’s say
skepticism of what we’re doing over there. And that was
totally unacceptable to them. So all these neocons are
registering disappointment. But I would argue that’s a electoral
asset, not a liability.
I have a prediction given what’s going on with these banks and
what’s going on in this kind of a I think we all agree the soft
landing concept is over. We’re going to be in a recession. The
war is going to end there because we’re not funding this
and American the American public is not going to want to see
10s of billions of dollars go into Ukraine. And to fund this
war in year two or three hundreds of billions. I’m just
saying it every month. Yeah.
I know the spending run rate of this war is actually greater
than what we did in Afghanistan and Afghanistan ended up being
a 20 year multi trillion dollar operation that just flushed all
that money down the drain. So yeah,
I mean, we’re in a greater run rate than Afghanistan. Yeah.
Do we know what the monthly run rate is for this? Oh my god,
how is it? We’ve appropriated over 130 billion Chamath and
Afghanistan, we spent 2 trillion over 20 years. So there’s 100
billion a year run rate. Yeah, this is think about what a
monumental waste of money that was and now look at the
financial crisis we’re in. Can you imagine if we could have 2
trillion back? I mean, all these trillions that we just
squandered instantly, we would take all those trillions and
trillions we squandered on stuff that didn’t matter. And now
we’re paying the price for it.
That could be education could be universal health care can be
paying down the debt.
How about paying down the debts? We don’t have all this
inflation.
Exactly. Let’s think logically here, the number one issue for
this country in the next election, I am with Friedberg
his great prediction from the year end show is we need a
president and we need an administration that is fiscally
responsible and controls the balance sheet in a logical
fashion, like the last two administrations have not seemed
capable of doing I am with Friedberg single issue voter
balance the budget, get spending under control, austerity
measures, hashtag, right for the Sultan of science.
Sorry, what’s that? Can you repeat that?
What I wanted to say, Chamath, is there are there any plugs for
the remaining part of the episode? Mr. Beast is curing
blindness and buying people’s shoes? Has he been canceled yet?
Aren’t you excited about superconductors and the benefit
for AI and energy storage and energy costs and humanity? Yeah,
what does it do to burn rate of a SAS?
Yeah, but I’m not I’m not like an expert at assessing like hard
science or hard tech. I mean, I’m a software investor.
I’m just a simple man. I’m just a software investor.
All right, everybody for the rain man himself, David Sachs,
the dictator, Chamath Palihapitiya, and the Sultan of
science, the prince of panic attacks no more. Mr. David
Friedberg. I’m the world’s greatest moderator, undisputed.
Congratulations, everybody, on another successful episode and
Friedberg. When are we locking in the date for all in summit
2023? My replies, my DMS are filled people want to know. Do
you have the date?
And soon we had a parking issue where they don’t want us parking
there. So as soon as we don’t need to park there, everybody
that’s what we told. So now they’ve gone back to their
committee to get approval for us doing it without parking and
just doing no parking or walking shuttles or people. Yeah, Uber,
Uber, Uber, Uber. Let’s get that. Hopefully, if they accept
it, then we are okay. How many shuttles do we have to take to
Uranus? Yeah, exactly. How am I the prince of panic attacks? I
think you’re the king of caps locks at this point. They were
called me J caps. J caps was the best one I heard talking about
panic attacks. Jake hell this weekend, man, panicking,
panicking. I was a sheer terror. Sure. I have literally gotten
rid of the caps lock. Everybody relax. You can follow me
twitter.com slash Jason. We’ll see you all next time. Bye bye.
Bye bye.
Let your winners ride.
Rain Man David
sack.
We open source it to the fans and they’ve just gone crazy with
it. Love you.
Besties are gone.
Dog taking a notice in your driveway.
We should all just get a room and just have one big huge orgy
because it’s like this like sexual tension but they just
need to release
waiting to get